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ABSTRACT 
Human intelligence from informants, criminals, good-Samaritans and cooperative 
individuals is the key to neutralizing major terrorist plots. The need for domestic 
intelligence collection in the United States is supported by a review of the national 
strategies and data collected from statements of Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
Department of Homeland Security officials. Unfortunately, scholarly articles and 
commentaries point to an inadequate human intelligence program five years after the 
events of September 11, 2001.   
This thesis presents a community based exploitation strategy for the expansion of 
domestic collection through the leveraging of state and local law enforcement, public and 
private collection. The strategy would take advantage of the significant untapped 
resources available to state and local law enforcement, public and private entities by 
encouraging sharing and discouraging hoarding.  The technology would do the heavy 
lifting by sifting through the vast amounts of available information to find the key piece 
of data.  Technology can assist analysts by allowing them to exploit the semantic process 
of the Global Justice Extensible Markup Language (XML), a computer language. 
Together, this exploitation strategy and technology will become part of new homeland 
security doctrine that could unleash the full potential of domestic collection and provide 
the missing pieces of the intelligence puzzle.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
The thesis explores leveraging state and local human intelligence (HUMINT) to 
increase collection data and expand overall domestic intelligence.  Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts to expand 
domestic intelligence, including coordination of state and local HUMINT, are reviewed.  
Impediments to the expansion of HUMINT include organizational, budgetary, 
technological and cultural roadblocks. Data sharing technology is evaluated as a possible 
mechanism to enable law enforcement sharing of the information that has already been 
collected by existing law enforcement systems and processes.      
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Domestic intelligence collection in the United States, specifically state and local 
HUMINT, is uncoordinated and inefficient to support the terrorism prevention mission. 
After the events of September 11, 2001, President Bush stressed the need for 
military, intelligence, law enforcement, and first responder efforts to focus on the 
prevention of future terrorist acts. Homeland security leaders recognized that timely and 
well-synthesized intelligence provided operators with the ability to interdict terrorists 
before they accomplished their mission.  Because intelligence is the centerpiece of 
prevention, intelligence agencies have labored to enhance their intelligence capabilities in 
the aftermath of September 11. 
Intelligence requires identifying information requirements, collecting information, 
analysis, dissemination of finished intelligence products and reevaluation. Efforts are 
underway throughout the United States to enhance analysis and dissemination through 
fusion centers and intelligence units in virtually every community.   Federal, state and 
local agencies have recognized the importance of increased analytical and information-
sharing capabilities to enhance the intelligence cycle.  While each of the intelligence 
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cycle steps provides its own challenges, domestic HUMINT collection has proved to be 
the limiting factor for domestic intelligence production. 
While combined federal, state and local efforts continue to expand the analytical 
and information-sharing components of the intelligence cycle through increased 
technology and training, HUMINT production continues to be hampered by inefficient 
domestic collection.  Evidence suggests law enforcement consumers are frustrated with 
the lack of actionable intelligence reported by domestic fusion centers.  This frustration is 
due in large part to the lack of domestic collection material for analysis and the reliance 
on open source information by analytical centers.  Without a concomitant increase in 
domestic collection, expanded analysis and dissemination mechanisms at fusion centers 
is limited to open source and foreign intelligence conclusions, which often lack 
actionable intelligence necessary for the prevention of major terrorism attacks.  
C.  METHODOLOGY   
1.  Interviews 
Interviews of federal, state and local intelligence executives were undertaken to 
establish the current environment in domestic intelligence collection activities and 
discuss future strategy and implementation. Special emphasis was placed on identifying 
the challenges and obstacles incurred in the expansion of domestic HUMINT activities. 
For example, what are the personnel and budget resource issues faced by agencies 
regarding HUMINT collection?  What are the legal impediments to domestic collection?  
How are the federal agencies utilizing state and local resources in support of HUMINT?  
The thesis hypothesis regarding leveraging state and local HUMINT will be evaluated.  
The critique will focus on the acceptance of an improved HUMINT acquisition strategy, 
especially the budgetary, organizational and cultural impediments that stand in the way of 
a national strategy to exploit existing collection capabilities. 
Selected chiefs and representatives of police were interviewed to evaluate local 
law enforcement efforts in domestic collection, use of local HUMINT in support of the 
war on terrorism, acceptance and cultural issues regarding a national HUMINT strategy 
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and other possible solutions to HUMINT expansion.  Law enforcement interviews were 
solicited from small, medium and large departments to represent the state and local law 
enforcement community as a whole. 
2.  Case Study 
A case study of the fusion process in the North Florida area was conducted to 
depict a typical effort at domestic intelligence fusion occurring at the state and local 
level.  The case study illustrates the process, goals, achievements, challenges, and 
obstacles from the state and local perspective.  
3.  Technology Studies 
Brief studies regarding several data exchange platforms being constructed by the 
FBI, DHS, and U.S. Navy are discussed to ascertain if these platforms could facilitate a 
national domestic HUMINT strategy. An analysis of the suitability of the national data 
platforms as vehicles for leveraging state and local information are discussed.  A study of 
the U.S. Navy’s Law Enforcement Information Exchange (LiNX) system is shown to 
illustrate an example of current technology being used to link law enforcement collection 
information across department lines in an analytical and sharing environment. 
D.  DATA 
The data surrounding domestic intelligence encompasses four categories of 
information: the national strategies and policies framing the situation; statements, articles 
and comments regarding the current and future state of domestic HUMINT collection; the 
adoption of Community Oriented Policing and Intelligence Led Policing by state and 
local law enforcement in America; and new intelligence sharing technologies to assist 
with collaboration.  
First, the need for domestic intelligence collection in the United States is 
supported by a review of the national strategies regarding intelligence expansion after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  An analysis of these intelligence milestones forms the 
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backdrop of the problem, namely the necessity for expansion of domestic collection, 
specifically in the area of HUMINT in support of the war on terrorism. 
Second, data collected from statements of FBI and DHS officials indicate that 
HUMINT needed to be expanded and that there were challenges involved in the 
expansion.1  After the events of September 11th, many improvements to the intelligence 
production cycle occurred. For example, many intelligence agencies created new and 
detailed collection requirements designed to address the terrorist threat.2  Similarly, many 
agencies increased their analytical capabilities through additional resources and 
technology in an effort to boost intelligence analysis and production.3 Furthermore, 
resources were and continue to be expended in the expansion of law enforcement sharing 
initiatives to expand the dissemination function.4  
Scholarly articles and commentaries, however, point to an inadequate HUMINT 
program five years after the events of September 11, 2001.  The 9/11 Commission 
Report, for example, was critical of the FBI’s status of HUMINT expansion and doubtful 
of its abilities to achieve significant results in this area.5 Moreover, a collaborative 
writing by former FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) executives concluded that 
intelligence was lacking HUMINT and not adequately addressing the issue of domestic 
 
1 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement of Robert S. Mueller III,  Director Federal Bureau of 
Investigation  before the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and 
Science, 109th Congress, 1st Session,  2005. Available Online:  
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller052405.htm  (accessed November 24, 2006); Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Statement of Willie T. Hulon, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism 
Division Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on 
Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census,  109  Congress,  2  
Session, 2006. Available Online:
th nd
  http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/bald071304.htm (accessed 
December 2, 2006);  Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement of John S. Pistole before the House 
Judiciary Committee, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, 2004.  Available Online: 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/pistole082304.htm (accessed November 24, 2006); Office of 
Homeland Security, Department Six Point Agenda (Washington, DC: DHS, 2006), 1. Available Online: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0646.shtm  (accessed  November 24, 2006.)  
2 Statement of John S. Pistole, FBI Deputy Director,1.  
3 Ibid. 
4Office of Homeland Security, Department Six Point Agenda (Washington, DC: DHS, 2006). 
Available Online: http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0646.shtm  (accessed November 24, 2006). 
5 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2004) 4, Available Online:  
http://www.911commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_12.pdf   (accessed November 24, 2006).  
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intelligence.6 Finally, commentators point to the relative size of the federal domestic 
effort in comparison to the overall intelligence community as an issue in collection 
efforts.7  The resulting conclusion is that federal domestic agencies are committing 
resources to analysis and dissemination, but are not increasing HUMINT on a nationwide 
scale.  The conclusion is that if federal agencies rely solely on their own collection efforts 
they will be at risk of not having the necessary information to predict and prevent the 
next major act of terrorism. 
Third, the literature on Community Oriented Policing and Intelligence Led 
Policing by state and local law enforcement and interviews of selected law enforcement 
representatives is used in this thesis.  Journal articles and reports after September 11, 
2001, look to intelligence fusion and analysis as the way for police units in the United 
States to support the war on terrorism.8 For example, in 2005, the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) issued their report regarding law enforcement’s 
role in the war on Terrorism. The report included a strategy of expansion of fusion 
centers and the integration of law enforcement information through increased analysis 
that “connects the dots” and prevents the next attack.9 These strategies are based on the 
premise that “all terrorism is local” and that local law enforcement generates the type of 
information to thwart an attack. 10  
Fourth, national and regional data platforms capable of digitally incorporating the 
sharing of law enforcement information were studied.  These platforms include the FBI’s 
 
6 Robert Bryant, et al., “America Needs More Spies,” The Economist, July 10, 2003. Available Online: 
http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1907776  (accessed November 26, 2006.).  
7 David E. Kaplan and Kevin Whitelaw, “Remaking U.S. Intelligence – Part II: the Money,” U. S. 
News and World Report, November 11, 2006. Available Online: 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/061103/3dni.money.htm (accessed November 24, 2006).  
8 Department of Justice, Intelligence Led Policing: the New Intelligence Architecture (Washington, 
DC: DOJ, 2005). Available Online: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210681.pdf  (accessed December 2, 
2006).   
9 International Association of Chiefs of Police, From Hometown Security to Homeland Security 
(Washington, DC: IACP, 2005). Available Online: 
http://www.theiacp.org/leg_policy/HomelandSecurityWP.PDF (accessed December 10, 2006).  
10 Ibid. 
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National Data Exchange,11 DHS’ Homeland Security Information Network and 
Homeland Security Data Network, the Regional Intelligence Information System and the 
U.S. Navy’s Law Enforcement Information Exchange.12  Agency website information 
and executive statements provide technical and operational information regarding these 
initiatives.  The data platforms provide nationwide accessibility to all law enforcement 
and promise the ability to exchange law enforcement information on a real time and in a 
collaborative environment.    
E.  LIMITS AND SIGNIFICANCE   
1.  Limits 
A review of police intelligence literature reveals many strategies to increase 
analysis and law enforcement sharing, but there is little literature available regarding the 
use and leveraging of police informers or police overt intelligence gathering in support of 
the war on terror.  In fact, the topic of domestic collection is addressed only as to the 
impact on civil liberties.  The literature is lacking research regarding new forms of 
domestic HUMINT collection.   
Because of the confidential nature of police informant operations and the need to 
restrict access, the literature is lacking research and scholarly articles on the topic of 
exploitation of existing collection resources.  The thesis addresses the issue via selected 
interviews of law enforcement representatives; however, additional research is needed to 
identify gaps in collection efforts at the state and local level.  Furthermore, data regarding 




11 Department of Justice, EGovernment Act Implementation Update (Washington, DC: Budget Data 
Request May 8, 2004). 3 Available Online: http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/ocio/egovactreport2004.pdf  
(accessed October 8, 2006). 
12 Department of Homeland Security, Information Sharing and Analysis (Washington, DC: DHS, 
2006). Available Online: http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare   (accessed November 26, 2006).  
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2.  Literature 
The thesis brings together various literatures in an effort to answer the research 
question.  The literature encompasses four separate topics describing: a. the framework 
for the current state of domestic intelligence; b. the need for expansion of domestic 
HUMINT; c. law enforcement and policing in the war on terrorism; and d. the technology 
capable of supporting a national HUMINT strategy.  These topics are woven together to 
answer questions not covered in the current literature.  The thesis synthesizes the 
available literature and provides the reader with insight into an emerging threat, namely, 
the lack of retrievable domestic HUMINT.  Furthermore, the interviews provide 
additional data regarding the use of police informers in support of domestic collection.  
Therefore, the thesis advances the literature regarding domestic HUMINT and provides 
insight into future challenges regarding domestic collection requirements.  
3.  Future Research Efforts 
As a public policy document, the thesis suggests a possible national strategy for 
leveraging domestic collection at the state and local level.  Future research is needed 
regarding the acceptance of such a policy by law enforcement and the relative success 
such a policy would have on the expansion of domestic HUMINT. Additional research 
regarding organizational and cultural bias toward the use of domestic collection is also 
needed.  The thesis does not address the issue of civil liberty concerns associated with all 
domestic collection.  
4.  Immediate Consumer 
The thesis is designed to serve the Department of Justice and Department of 
Homeland Security, which are responsible for national domestic collection activities and 
intelligence strategy.  Currently, the FBI is responsible for domestic intelligence 
investigations and the primary federal collector of domestic HUMINT information.  DHS 
is responsible for analysis of domestic information in an “all-hazards” approach.  Both 
the FBI and DHS are primary consumers of such a policy and would ultimately be 
responsible for promulgation and implementation. 
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F. ROAD MAP 
Chapter II – The Need for Better Collection 
Chapter II provides information regarding general intelligence knowledge, terms 
and methodologies necessary for the formulation and advancement of the thesis.  
Specifically, the chapter addresses the importance of collection and HUMINT.  
Challenges to HUMINT collection are discussed as they relate to the lack of HUMINT 
available to analysts at state and regional fusion centers. 
Chapter III – The Current Domestic Intelligence Environment 
Chapter III provides the reader with a snapshot of current federal, state and local 
domestic intelligence efforts.  The chapter highlights changes and developments by the 
FBI and DHS with respect to their intelligence operations after September 11, 2001.  
State and local law enforcement intelligence operations are also described, including the 
emergence of Community Oriented Policing and Intelligence Led Policing in American 
law enforcement. 
Chapter IV – The Future in Domestic Intelligence 
The future of domestic intelligence in the United States is discussed as it relates to 
HUMINT collection and analysis at state and local fusion centers.  The issue of stove 
piped information and knowledge management limitations is presented as an obstacle to 
transmittal of collection data to fusion centers.  Data platforms and technology that may 
affect future aggregation of domestic intelligence information are reviewed.  
Chapter V – Obstacles to National Collection and Analysis 
Chapter V addresses the obstacles to collection and analysis including legal 
restrictions, cultural issues, funding restraints and recalcitrant bureaucracies.  A change 
methodology including change agents and the need for leadership is addressed.  
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Chapter VI – Strategy and Conclusion 
The final chapter provides a strategy for unleashing stove piped domestic 
collection including an adaptation of W. Chan Kim’s and Renee Mauborgne’s Blue 
Ocean Strategy.  The conclusion advocates the need for accessing and exploiting state 
and local domestic collection using analytical technology instead of costly and intrusive 
expansion of federal collection programs.   Recommendations include cultural, funding, 
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II.  THE NEED FOR BETTER COLLECTION  
After the events of September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush Administration 
adopted a strategy to expand domestic intelligence to prevent the next act of terrorism. In 
2004, the president of the United States issued Executive Orders 13355 and 13356, which 
restructured, delineated and expanded intelligence management and dissemination within 
the Intelligence Community (IC).13 That same year, Congress passed the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which established the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI).14  In 2005, the DNI office issued a formal strategy outlining 
the new course for domestic intelligence.15 The DNI’s strategy called for the 
establishment of a “National Clandestine service to integrate all elements of human 
source collection.”16 This strategy also called for the expansion of an integrated 
intelligence process that conformed to existing legal and civil liberty protections.17  To 
implement the domestic parts of the new intelligence model, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) issued a strategy to augment intelligence by creating the Directorate 
of Intelligence.18 The FBI strategy included the prevention of terrorism through the 
“expansion of robust human source reporting.”19 On April 28, 2005, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) issued its Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative, 
 
13 U. S. President Executive Order, Strengthening Management of the Intelligence Community, 
Executive Order 13355 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004). Available Online: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13355.htm (accessed November 29, 2006); U.S. President Executive 
Order. Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans, Executive Order 13356 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004). Available Online: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-4.html (accessed November 29, 2006). 
14 U.S. Congress, House, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, December 7, 
2004, 108th Cong, 2d session, House report No. 108-796 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
2004). Available Online: http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf  (accessed December 2, 2006). 
15 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of 
America (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2005). Available Online: 
http://www.dni.gov/publications/NISOctober2005.pdf  (accessed December 2, 2006). 
16 Ibid., 13. 
17 Ibid., 11. 
18 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Strategic Plan 2004-2009 (Washington, DC: FBI, 2003). Available 
Online: http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/strategicplanfull.pdf   (accessed December 2, 2006). 
19 Ibid., Section IIB1. 
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which highlighted the need for domestic collection of intelligence from information 
derived from state, tribal, and local government sources.20   
In addition to the administration’s policies and strategies, several government 
entities critically reviewed the events of September 11, 2001, and provided insight and 
recommendations regarding intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination.  The first 
major investigation of the intelligence shortcomings of the United States was conducted 
by a joint inquiry of the Congress of the United States.  The report was released on 
December 10, 2002.21  The report recommended that the government “establish 
capabilities for the timely sharing of intelligence within the intelligence community and 
with appropriate other federal, state, and local authorities.”  Similarly, the 9/11 
Commission Report released on July 22, 2004, found that information was not shared 
adequately across jurisdictional boundaries and that a national intelligence center was 
necessary to coordinate domestic intelligence.22    On July 7, 2004, the Senate’s 
Intelligence Committee released its report on prewar-intelligence calling, for the 
development and recruiting of sources with direct access to information.23 The 
Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, commonly known as The WMD Commission, issued its report on March 31, 
2005, and recommended, among other things, that HUMINT collection should be 
standardized under one agency, namely the CIA.24  Together, these strategies and  
 
 
20 Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland 
Security Intelligence and information Fusion (Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security, 2002), 2. 
Available Online: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC_HSIntelInfoFusion_Apr05.pdf  (accessed, 
December 2, 2006). 
21 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2001, unclassified version of report, December 2002, 4. 
22 National Commission on Terrorist Acts upon the United States, the 9/11 Commission Report (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), 353, 411. 
23 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar 
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 7, 2004, 34. Available Online: 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/intel_reform.html (accessed September 3, 2007). 
24 Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005, 22. Available Online: 
http://www.wmd.gov/report/ (accessed September 7, 2007). 
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recommendations demonstrate the consensus behind the expansion of domestic 
intelligence and the creation of a national strategy for domestic HUMINT within the 
United States after 2001. 
A review of domestic intelligence requires a discussion about the components of 
intelligence.  Efforts at expanding domestic intelligence can be categorized according to 
each component.    Analyzing the intelligence cycle reveals the importance of collection 
to the process and human intelligence as the key to effective domestic collection. 
A. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
It is important to distinguish intelligence from information.  Information sharing, 
especially in law enforcement circles, is often confused with the dissemination of 
intelligence.  Intelligence can be distinguished from information as a subset.  Intelligence 
is information that has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet the needs of a 
policy maker.25 The process of identifying the requirements of the policy maker, 
collecting information, analyzing it, and disseminating it to the appropriate consumers is 
known as the intelligence cycle or intelligence process.26 The cycle, often described or 
illustrated as a unidirectional arc, is actually closer to a multidirectional process path with 
multiple opportunities for feedback and additional analysis.27   
 
25 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence from Secrets to Policy (CQ Press, Washington, DC: 2006), 2. 
26 Ibid., 65. 
27 Ibid., 66. 
 Figure 1.   Intelligence Cycle. 
 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLECTION  
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of intelligence within the intelligence cycle is 
collection.  Known as the bedrock of intelligence, collection is the accumulation of 
information for analysis.28  Collection can be complicated, depending on the requirement 
question to be answered, because it often involves the receipt of information not easily or 
readily obtained through other means.  Collection requirements respond to the questions a 
policy maker needs answered.  The questions are often challenging and protected by 
enemy or criminal opposition.  The collector is faced with obtaining information that is 
difficult to obtain or hidden from plain view.  Instead of attempting to answer large 
intelligence questions outright, intelligence professionals seek to breakdown 
 14
                                                 
28 Lowenthal, Intelligence from Secrets to Policy, 68. 
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requirements into packets of information that can be analyzed. Known as intelligence 
requirements, these requests outline specific bits of information to be collected.  Together 
they help the analyst form the answers to the policy questions being investigated. 
Within the art of collection are several different collection disciplines known as 
INTs.  The collection disciplines include Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Geospatial 
Intelligence (GEOINT), Measurements and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Open 
Source Intelligence (OSINT), and Human Intelligence (HUMINT).   
Within HUMINT are two broad categories known as overt and covert HUMINT.  
These categories indicate whether or not the human collector’s identity is either known or 
concealed from the subject of collection.  For example, spies operating under cover are 
referred to as covert collectors, while police officers receiving information from 
community members can be described as overt collectors. In each case the identity of the 
individual as collector is either concealed or known respectively.  Domestic HUMINT 
efforts can therefore be described as covert operations, i.e. informants, spies, undercover 
Agents, or overt intelligence gathering such as community policing, community outreach 
and other overt law enforcement activities.  Both forms of HUMINT play a significant 
role in the domestic intelligence cycle.  While federal, state and local law enforcement 
utilize both overt and covert collection techniques; these efforts are uncoordinated and 
lack national strategy.  
C. IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE TO COLLECTION 
Prior to September 11, 2001, domestic intelligence gathering by state and local 
law enforcement in the United States had been a function of the analysis of predicated 
investigative law enforcement information.  That is, information which was originally 
obtained from criminal investigations initiated as a result of probable cause that a crime 
had been, or was about to be, committed.  The post September 11th paradigm called for 
domestic intelligence gathering, not necessarily predicated on prosecution, but for the 
prevention of an attack.  No longer was there time to wait for the crime to occur and 
coordinate the intelligence to apprehend the perpetrators, instead efforts were underway 
to identify the conspirators before they were able to act.   
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In the FBI, for example, the shift from crime solving to prevention was, and 
continues to be, a significant challenge after September 11, 2001. 29 The large shift in 
thinking, as well as resources, evolved into the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) within the 
FBI, with the mission of “connecting the dots” before the next major attack occurred.  
Although intelligence units in the FBI were nothing new, the FBI DI was now 
responsible for the FBI’s domestic collection, analysis and dissemination process.  The 
post September 11th collection process, centered on intelligence community collection 
requirements, directed a Bureau-wide effort of intelligence gathering tailored to specific 
intelligence needs.  The analysis component continued to be expanded as a result of huge 
increases in analytical resources, allowing the DI to create tactical, strategic and global 
analysis of information.  The dissemination processes, known mostly for its Intelligence 
Information Reports, began to disseminate thousands of reports to the intelligence 
community.  The HUMINT component also was expanded through recruitment of 
sources and expansion of community outreach programs.   
In spite of the expansions, the HUMINT collection component continues to be the 
most challenging part of the intelligence cycle.   The requirement, analytical and 
dissemination functions, challenged with many obstacles, are largely a function of 
resources and new business practices.  The requirement and analytical processes are 
replicated throughout the country in many quality intelligence and fusion centers.  
Enhanced analytical products are being created throughout the country using expanded 
analytical resources and better analytical tools.  The FBI dissemination process, 
hampered by information technology short comings and information sharing issues, will 
eventually benefit from equipment updates and new sharing practices.  Although there 
are many analytical centers around the United States, collectors of intelligence are more 
limited. While analytical and information sharing concerns often dominate the public 




29Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to Congress, July 27, 2005. Available Online: 
http://www.fbi.gov.congress/congress05/mueller072705.htm  (accessed May 23, 2006). 
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analyzed and disseminated.  The collection requirement is complicated by the need to 
cultivate human sources of information, increase liaison activities, and establish technical 
and electronic collaborative systems.  
To provide first responders with actionable intelligence, it is necessary to gather 
intelligence regarding the activities of individuals who have not yet committed a crime 
but may be planning to do so.  The underpinning of prevention is a robust collection 
capability.  The intelligence base from which the analytical process stems and generates 
law enforcement sharing depends upon it.  The post September 11th environment calls for 
aggressive collection of overt and covert human intelligence to predict vulnerabilities and 
identify trends.  This will undoubtedly involve significant increases in the domestic 
collection capability of the law enforcement and intelligence community. For example, 
data mining techniques designed to cull through millions of records, already used 
extensively by the private sector and by foreign intelligence collectors, will have to be 
applied to the domestic arena. Government partnerships with private sector entities 
capable of providing significant intelligence through increased technology will also 
increase.  These and other new methods will undoubtedly conflict with civil liberty and 
privacy concerns.  Ultimately, a balance of competing interests will be necessary to 
address the conflicting priorities of legitimate intelligence gathering in support of 
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Figure 2.   Total HUMINT Base: Overall HUMINT capability increases as covert and overt 
HUMINT are leveraged through collaboration with state and local entities within 
the community. The figure depicts HUMINT expanding geometrically as it is 









                                                
III. THE CURRENT DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 
ENVIRONMENT 
Since September 11, 2001, governmental bodies, journalists, analysts, 
academicians and practitioners have recommended sweeping changes to the federal 
domestic intelligence model of the United States.  These observers have focused on 
reforms to the FBI and DHS.  Recommendations for reform of the FBI have included 
divesting the agency of its intelligence and counterterrorism functions. Known as the 
“MI-5” model, proponents of a new agency solution suggest such an agency would 
enhance domestic collection and provide policy makers with better intelligence.  
Detractors contend that the FBI has long standing infrastructure and investigative skills 
needed for the intelligence mission, and that reforming the FBI is more efficient.   
This chapter addresses these calls for reform by describing changes and 
developments made to the intelligence programs of the FBI and DHS after September 11, 
2001.  Specifically, the chapter will discuss expansions of the FBI’s Directorate of 
Intelligence and the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis.  Additionally, the chapter 
addresses the growing body of intelligence within the state and local law enforcement 
community as a result of Community Oriented Policing and Intelligence Led Policing 
programs. 
A. FBI INTELLIGENCE MODEL 
Efforts at reforming the FBI have centered on the creation of the Directorate of 
Intelligence (FBI/DI) and the adoption of the new Model Counterterrorism Investigative 
Strategy.  In July 2003, the FBI issued this strategy to all field offices.30  The newly 
created FBI/DI expanded intelligence and analytical resources and was designed to 
 
30 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The FBI Counterterrorism Program Since 9/11,” Report to the 
Terrorism Commission on the events of September 11, 2001, 29. Available Online: 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/commission/9-11commissionrep.pdf  (accessed May 30, 2007). 
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provide intelligence with independent and highly trained intelligence professionals 
dedicated to intelligence collection and management. 31
The Model Counterterrorism Strategy combined the investigative tools available 
to criminal and intelligence investigations under one new investigative classification.  
Criminal tools such as Grand Jury Subpoenas, search warrants, Title III wire taps and 
criminal informants were merged with National Security intelligence and investigative 
tools such as National Security Letters, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court orders 
and intelligence asset information. The combined investigative strategy afforded 
investigators the use of all investigative tools available to the FBI under one investigative 
classification.  This scenario was impossible prior to September 11, 2001, as a result of 
the infamous “wall” procedure which segregated criminal and intelligence 
investigations.32
Critics of the FBI’s new plan, however, were quick to attack its usefulness.  For 
example, John Lehman, of the 9/11 Commission, wrote in an editorial piece in the 
Washington Post, stating that  
Congress sought to remedy this problem by creating a national security 
service within the FBI to focus on preventive intelligence rather than 
forensic evidence. This has proved to be a complete failure.33  
A similar conclusion was offered by Judge Richard Posner on August 6, 2006:  
The bureau is a criminal investigation agency. Its orientation is toward 
arrest and prosecution rather than toward the patient gathering of 
intelligence with a view to understanding and penetrating a terrorist 






31  Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: FBI, 2006). Available 
Online: http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/transformation/ct.htm (accessed, November 24, 2006). 
32 FBI Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: The FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Program Since 9/11 (April 14, 2004). 
33 John Lehman, “We’re Not Winning This War,” The Washington Post, August 31, 2006; A25. 
Available Online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
yn/content/article/2006/08/30/AR2006083002730.html (accessed March 17, 2007).  
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prosecution, is to continue an investigation into a terrorist plot just long 
enough to obtain enough evidence to arrest and prosecute a respectable 
number of plotters.34
The Markle Report, which was also critical of the FBI, cited two flaws in the 
FBI’s approach to Domestic Intelligence.  First, the report noted that inviting the FBI to 
investigate citizens not predicated by criminal activity incurred a conflict of interest for 
the FBI.  Second, the report stated that the FBI was not equipped to provide analytical 
intelligence reporting to other parts of the federal government.   
The premise that the FBI has a conflict of interest has been stated by others to 
support the opposite conclusion:  A stand alone domestic intelligence agency without the 
concomitant role of enforcing civil rights would be more likely to violate privacy issues 
then a law enforcement agency.35 The Markle Report’s “checkered history” quote refers 
to the abuses sustained by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and his family during the FBI’s 
Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) Era of the 1960s. Significant changes 
have occurred in the FBI since that era.  The 9/11 Commission also tackled the issue of 
FBI abuses in the 1960s. They concluded that after the criticisms of the FBI by the 
Church Committee in the 1970s, “the pendulum swung away from those types of 
investigations in the 1980s and 1990s.”  The Committee also concluded that “if a new 
domestic intelligence agency were outside the Department of Justice, the process of legal 
oversight-never easy- could become even more difficult.”36   
Critics also have suggested that the FBI is too entrenched in police culture and not 
suited for the intelligence mission.  The Boston Herald recently wrote “FBI culture is a 
police culture, not a counter-spy culture. And it’s likely it will stay that way. Congress is 
in a far better position to mobilize a counter-spy culture outside the agency than even the 
 
34Richard A. Posner, “We Need Our Own MI5,” The Washington Post, August 15, 2006, A13. 
Available Online: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/08/14/AR2006081401160.html (accessed 
March 17, 2007).   
35 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2004), 423, Available Online:  
http://www.911commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_12.pdf   (accessed November 24, 2006).  
36 Ibid. 
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most well-intentioned FBI director could do inside the agency.”37 In response to these 
criticisms, the FBI has created specific career paths and training programs to make the 
intelligence programs independent from the criminal side of the house. 
The tendency exhibited here is to paint the Bureau with a wide brush and to refer 
to its history and stereotypes as current fact.  In reality, the Bureau has undergone 
significant changes to adapt to the post September 11th counterterrorism environment.  
For example, the FBI/DI is now headed by an Assistant Director.  The FBI/DI has hired 
over two thousand analysts and has established Field Intelligence Groups in all 56 FBI 
field offices.  It has a College of Analytical Studies, which is an analytical training 
program that helps build relationships with numerous other intelligence agencies 
including the CIA and MI-5.  And, although the FBI/DI lacks academic maturity, the 
program is proceeding quickly and decisively in an independent fashion.  
The FBI has retained the responsibility to recruit and task informants in domestic 
intelligence investigations.  An important part of the FBI’s Intelligence Program is the 
expansion of covert HUMINT in all of its programs.  While specific figures regarding 
increases in human sources are classified, the FBI’s report to the 9/11 Commission on 
changes since 2001 stated that one of the “yardsticks” for measuring the effectiveness of 
a counterterrorism program was the development of human assets.  The report stated that 
an application of these yardsticks demonstrated that progress in expanding the human 
source program had been achieved since September 11, 2001.38  The fact that both 
Agents and analysts in the counterterrorism program have been increased should lead the 
reader to conclude that the FBI human asset program has been significantly expanded. 
Although the FBI has made gains in terms of expansion of its terrorism and 
intelligence programs, as of 2005, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, the FBI had 
been unable to expand domestic human intelligence.  The report stated that “despite the 
widespread view that assets and informants are the best source of intelligence,” the FBI 
 
37 Boston Herald Editorial Staff, “We Need an American MI-5,” Boston Herald, August 27, 2006. 
Available Online: http://news.bostonherald.com/editorial/view.bg?articleid=154613 (accessed April 29, 
2007).  
38 The FBI Counterterrorism Program since 9/11, 63. 
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was unsuccessful in recruiting informants into high level terrorist circles.39 Insomuch as 
the expansion of intelligence is essential to the prevention of terrorism and an integral 
part of the national strategy, the FBI’s covert resources alone will not adequately expand 
overall domestic intelligence production.  
One way to overcome insufficient covert human collection assets is to expand 
collection through overt community outreach programs.  The FBI had long recognized 
the importance of community cooperation to fight crime.  For many years, the Bureau 
had operated community outreach programs designed to form relationships with 
minority, civic, civil rights and other groups.  For example, minority groups were 
contacted to assist with Civil Rights investigations.  Civic groups were targeted to 
enhance corporate fraud and public corruption investigations.  And civil rights groups 
were asked to provide information concerning police abuse and hate crimes. These 
programs existed in every FBI field office.  The role and scope of these units remained 
essentially the same for decades. 
After the events of September 11, 2001, however, the FBI began to shift its efforts 
to broaden intelligence collection and to expand community enhanced liaison programs.  
As a result, almost all criminal and intelligence programs in the FBI have seen a surge in 
community based intelligence gathering.  While some of the programs are not termed 
intelligence gathering per se, all share certain things in common.  For instance, 
counterterrorism programs strive to form positive relationships with members of the 
Muslim community through meetings and working groups from the area mosques, 
Islamic centers and clubs.  The meetings allow both parties to get to know each other and 
to break down negative stereotypes.   
Cyber programs have likewise initiated “Infragard” chapters all over the country.  
These working groups target information technology professionals in major commercial  
 
 
39 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 12 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 4. Available Online:  
http://www.911commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_12.pdf   (accessed November 24, 2006). 
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and industrial applications who might be targets of computer intrusions or internet fraud.  
These working groups also provide training and intelligence bulletin information to the 
members. 
Another recently expanded outreach program is the Field Intelligence Groups 
(FIG), which undertake mapping and threat assessment initiatives.40  FIGs, as the field 
extension of the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence, are producing programmatic threat 
assessments for locations all around the country.  These assessments are based on 
aggressive mapping and surveying regional areas known as domains.  Surveys include 
area law enforcement at all levels, open source information, and analysis of FBI 
information. Liaison, working groups and relationships are the key to the success of these 
programs.  Broad based knowledge from multiple sources is intended to provide detailed, 
specific domain mapping. 
Legacy community outreach programs such as the Civil Rights and minority 
programs also have seen an upsurge in tempo and scope.   Civil Rights programs are now 
encouraged to establish working groups and task forces with all significant minorities, 
civic and non-governmental organizations in a region, instead of only the predominant or 
large group.  This has resulted in an increase in meetings and liaison with groups 
throughout the country. 
Traditional task group operations in the criminal arena continue to expand and 
concentrate on force multiplication and increased use of civilian partnerships.  Each FBI 
field division also is expected to conduct yearly Citizens’ Academies in their respective 
cities.  The Citizens’ Academy affords participants an up close view of the FBI and its 
operations.   The FBI in turn is building a cadre of civilian ambassadors to promote 
cooperation and civic involvement.  The alumni assist with recruiting, community 
awareness, business liaison and promotion of the FBI’s overall mission.  Mission 
awareness and personal relationships with agency representatives increases the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the FBI. 
 
40 The FBI Counterterrorism Program since 9/11, 28. 
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The next step in the expansion of community outreach process is the national 
coordination of these programs.  Coordination increases the productivity of the FBI’s 
overt collection operations.  Many of these programs overlap or produce information of 
interest to more than one kind of investigation. By coordinating these efforts, the 
programs are more responsive to their members.  Moreover, civilians tend to be 
associated with multiple groups and societies which lend themselves to multiple 
collection efforts and disciplines.  The coordination of these programs gives the FBI the 
ability to take advantage of the scope of its liaison and jurisdiction on a national scale.    
B.  DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE MODEL   
The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OI&A) was formed in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001.  It is dedicated to the analysis of all government related 
intelligence pertinent to the homeland security of the United States.41 The OI&A was 
intended to act as a one stop shopping point for all domestic analysis.  DHS is responsible 
for the analysis of all matters pertaining to the nation’s current or future vulnerabilities.42 
To accomplish this, DHS must collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence that may 
have an impact on the protection of national infrastructure.  While the OI&A does not 
have specific collection authority itself, it is mandated to receive domestic collection 
intelligence from other collection agencies within and outside the Department, including 
Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States 
Secret Service, United States Coast Guard, Department of Defense agencies, FBI, CIA 
and others.43  The OI&A also receives terrorism specific data from the National 
Counterterrorism Center, which is comprised of all intelligence agencies collecting on 
terrorism related matters. 
 
41 Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, “Intelligence, Police and Counterterrorism: Assessing Post 9/11 
Initiatives,” Rand Reports, October 30, 2003, 12. Available Online:  
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/additional/intelinputv2.pdf  (accessed August 19, 2007). 
42 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS webpage,” Available Online: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare  (accessed June 3, 2007). 
43 Ibid. 
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The DHS Intelligence Section’s priorities include improving the quality of 
intelligence analysis across the Department, integrating the DHS intelligence enterprise, 
strengthening support for state and local authorities, ensuring DHS takes its full place in 
the intelligence community and solidifying the DHS relationship with Congress.44  
The first three priorities are embedded in the Department’s efforts to fund, 
establish, guide and leverage the fusion centers around the country.  Central to the DHS’ 
efforts to collect intelligence is the emergence of the state fusion centers.  DHS considers 
the fusion center network to be an essential component of the national intelligence 
architecture.45 The state and Local Fusion Center Program is a direct outgrowth of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004.46  Both pieces of legislation have called for a more robust national 
intelligence picture able to draw upon federal, state, local and tribal assets.47  By 
establishing a robust fusion center network, DHS improves intelligence analysis, 
collection and dissemination.   
The fusion centers also provide DHS with a crucial platform for “push and pull” 
of information from the state and local arena.  The state and local threat information is 
considered vital to the overall threat matrix and vulnerability assessment mission.  By 
investing in the fusion centers, DHS not only gains connectivity but also strengthens state 
and local departments’ intelligence efforts simultaneously.  DHS analysts and 
intelligence officers assigned to state fusion centers are able to leverage intelligence vital 
to this process, and act as force multipliers of scarce DHS intelligence resources.  
 
44 Statement of Assistant Secretary Charles E. Allen to the U.S House of Representatives, May 24, 
2006, 2. Available Online: http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070413143439-12273.pdf  
(accessed June 6, 2007). 
45 Telephonic Interview of Jack Tomarchio, Deputy Chief intelligence Officer, Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, by the author on  February 27, 2007.  
46 Statement of Assistant Secretary Charles E. Allen to the Subcommittee on Intelligence Information 
Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, House Homeland Security Committee, February 14, 2007, 4. 




                                                
The fusion centers’ ability to serve as a two-way street of information allows 
DHS to collect and disseminate information with up to 70 regional and state intelligence 
centers.48  The Homeland Security Data Network, (HSDN) is a classified data platform 
capable of transmitting classified information between these fusion centers.  DHS has 
budgeted $110,000 per fusion center for the purposes of wiring HSDN into each center.  
DHS plans to have “tailored, multi-disciplinary teams of intelligence and operational 
professionals in major fusion centers nationwide by the end of fiscal year 2008.”49 This is 
an ambitious plan that will require deploying over 200 highly trained and skilled 
intelligence officers/analysts by 2008.  DHS has currently deployed 16 officers to various 
fusion centers around the country.50  
Between the National Counter Terrorism Center representation and the fusion 
center network of networks, DHS envisions a national intelligence picture capable of 
detailed threat assessments.  The OI&A will receive the data and “use this data to 1) map 
potential threats against existing vulnerability assessments, 2) take and recommend 
responses to identified challenges contingencies; and 3) set national priorities for critical 
infrastructure protection.”51
According to the FBI, DHS plays a crucial role in “assessing and protecting 
vulnerabilities in our national infrastructure and at the borders.”52 Coordination is 
achieved through the sharing of databases at the headquarters level and through task force 
collaboration at the field level.53  Analysts from both departments hold weekly briefings 
regarding pertinent intelligence and executives from both departments are exchanged to 
foster better understanding of the culture and products of other organizations.54
 
 
48 Statement of Assistant Secretary Charles E. Allen. 
49 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS webpage.” Available Online: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm  (accessed May 30, 2007). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Chalk and Rosenau, “Intelligence, Police and Counterterrorism: Assessing Post 9/11 Initiatives,”14. 





Figure 3.   Roles and responsibilities of Homeland Security Intelligence and Information 
Analysis.55 
 
C.  THE STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE 
MODEL: AN UNTAPPED INFORMATION BONANZA 
This section discusses the emergence of state and local law enforcement domestic 
intelligence as a result of community oriented and intelligence led policing programs.  
The section describes the evolution of intelligence in policing and the increasing volume 
of intelligence data being collected. The section also discusses obstacles in accessing data 





                                                 
55 Todd Masse, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches 
(Congressional Research Service, August 18, 2006), Figure 2, CRS-10. 
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1.  Community Oriented Policing   
Approximately 30 years ago, basic policing philosophy began to shift from patrol 
and response to gaining awareness on the ground by engaging the community.56  Law 
enforcement began to work closely with communities and officers transitioned from 
squad cars to bicycle patrols.  As police officers interacted more and more with the 
public, police departments gained valuable intelligence.  Across the country, police 
departments slowly began to see the wisdom and effectiveness of engaging the public.  In 
the ensuing years, a majority of departments adopted the model and adapted it to their 
own particular needs. By 1997, 98% of departments with over 500 officers had adopted 
Community Oriented Policing (COP) in America.57  80% of the large departments had 
created Neighborhood Watch programs, 85% held police community meetings and 97% 
said COP had improved cooperation between police and citizens.58   As of 2003, 82% of 
all departments were utilizing COP, including 50 departments with more then 1000 
officers and 61% of departments who employed at least 100 officers.59 The shift to COP 
created safer neighborhoods and better relations between police and the community.   
The close relationship with the public created more information about the 
community, its players and the social environment.  Police departments were more 
attuned to the problems of the community and were able to prevent crime by interdicting 
situations before they resulted in violations of the law.  A by-product of COP was 
increased intelligence and information about the community. 
 
56 Department of Justice, “Community Oriented Policing Services, Protecting Your Community from 
Terrorism: Strategies for local Law Enforcement, The Production and Sharing of Intelligence,” Volume 4, 
February 2005, VII. Available Online: http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=143  (accessed August 
19, 2007). 
57 National Institute of Justice, “Community Policing: 1997 National Survey Update of Police and 
Sheriff’s Departments,” September 22, 2000, iii. Available Online: 
http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/ncj_police0601.pdf  (accessed August 19, 2007). 
58 Ibid, iv, v. 
59 Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, Local Police 
Departments, 2003, May 2006, 7. Available online: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm  (accessed 
August 19, 2007). 
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After September 11, 2001, law enforcement professionals began advocating the 
COP model as an intelligence vehicle for preventing terrorism.60 The challenge therefore 
was to understand the terrorism intelligence gap in terms of community policing and 
apply the lessons from past successes without violating individual’s civil liberties.61  The 
idea that information sharing alone could solve the intelligence gap became a 
misconception.62 It became apparent that collecting the right information, at the right 
time, and sharing it, was the goal.  Because police officers involved in COP can be 
viewed as overt collectors, they can be the crucial pieces of the puzzle that detect 
anomalies in the community.63  According to Peter Modaferri, Chief of Detectives, 
Rockland County, NY, “we need a generation of police officers who know how to 
identify, collect, and use information before we can ensure legitimately productive 
information sharing.”64   
2. Intelligence Led Policing  
The conceptualization of the patrol officer as overt collector led to crime fighting 
via intelligence gathering and analysis.65  The next generation in police philosophy 
became known as Intelligence Led Policing (ILP).  ILP, which emerged in the 1990s, was 
defined as a collaborative enterprise that relied on improved intelligence gathering and 
community oriented policing.66 Police Chief William J. Bratton described ILP as, “the 
collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end-product designed to 
 
60 Heather J. Davies and Gerard R. Murphy, “Protecting Your Community from Terrorism,” Police 
Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC: March 2004, 1. Available Online: 




63 Ibid., 23. 
64 Ibid., 31. 
65 George L. Kelling and William J. Bratton, “Policing Terrorism,” Manhattan Institute, No. 43, 
September 2006, 5. Available Online: http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cb_43.htm (accessed June 
6, 2007). 
66 Marilyn Peterson, “Intelligence Led Policing: The New intelligence Architecture,” Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, NCJ 210681, VII, September 2005. Available Online: 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210681.pdf  (accessed June 6, 2007). 
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inform police decision making at both the tactical and strategic levels.”67 ILP combined 
the strengths of COP and leveraged it by adding the analysis of key data.  Instead of 
wasting personnel resources on areas devoid of crime, ILP concentrated COP on those 
communities that analysis indicated would benefit from a greater police presence.  
Mapping and police statistical analysis provided hard data for police managers to use in 
assigning resources and creating strategy.  Popularized by the New York Police 
Department in the 1990s, intelligence led policing was able to drastically reduce crime in 
New York City by adjusting an existing COP program according to intelligence and 
analytical data.68  
Since September 11, 2001, ILP has been suggested as the model for terrorism 
policing.  The theory, much like that of COP, is that ILP can be applied to terrorism by 
adjusting the data collection points and focusing the resources on terrorist related 
indicators.   
Intelligence operations by state and local departments, however, have been 
hindered by lack of policies, procedures and training.69  Most law enforcement 
departments do not have intelligence units; only 100 of the larger departments have 
established intelligence units.70 The majority of law enforcement has not been able to 
realize the potential of ILP.  While COP was inherent in smaller departments as a 
function of the relative size of the community and the department, ILP is dependant upon 
analytical resources and information technology.  This is important because the success 
of fusion centers depends on the free flow of reporting from the vast array of law 
enforcement departments throughout the United States. Without the benefits of ILP and 
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are relied upon to relay information to the fusion centers through informal channels.  This 
puts a tremendous responsibility and burden on patrol officers from smaller departments 
and rural America.  
Prompting individual officers to recognize, collect and disseminate information is 
a function of training.  Many larger departments are creating training regimens for their 
smaller department colleagues to expand their collection capabilities.  For example, the 
Los Angeles Police Department, through its training officer program, conducts terrorism 
and cultural awareness training for multiple jurisdictions and organizations to increase 
overall collection of information flowing to the Terrorism and Early Warning Center and 
the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC).71  The JRIC then is able to concentrate on 
tips, leads and indicators of threat information and run them against trend analysis 
programs to conduct prevention activities.72  
While the trained police officer continues to be a vital part of domestic 
intelligence in the war on terror, the requirement to collect information places the burden 
on the individual police officer to recognize the abnormal behavior and report it to the 
appropriate entity.  This technique also is dependent on training and the availability of 
appropriate and convenient reporting channels.  If COP is to be leveraged for domestic 
collection, police reports and communications need to be leveraged with analytical 
technology. 
Information garnered by a community based police officer needs to be recorded 
and uploaded to local databases regardless of the officer’s training or expertise.  Raw data 
transmitted to the fusion network can be accessed by trained analysts using state of the art 
analytical technology to link information across jurisdictional and state lines.   This 
information could prove to be the key piece of information needed to prevent a terrorism 
attack.  There is always a risk that a piece of information which may have seemed 
insignificant or not worth reporting to anyone outside the department might be discarded.  
By compiling all information and using technology to sift through it, collection is 
 
71 Interview of Robert V. Fox, Lieutenant, LAPD JRIC by the author on May 7, 2007, Destin, Florida. 
72 Ibid. 
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maximized and analytical products are expanded.  The analytical product, therefore, 
becomes significantly greater then the sum of what might appear to be seemingly 
insignificant parts. 
Relying on self reporting by police officers affects many police units.  When 
officers do not have the time or inclination to recognize trends, anomalies or indicators 
outside their specific bailiwick, this is termed the “bloodhound” effect.73  Police officers, 
like bloodhounds, can be so focused on their specific duties, that they seem oblivious to 
other concerns. While this may appear as a negative attribute of the officer, focus and 
concentration are often the difference between a good investigator and a great one.  It 
also may be the difference between life and death when focusing on staying alive and 
protecting oneself is tantamount.  Attention to detail is, therefore, necessary in police 
work if we desire complicated investigations and safe investigators.  The bloodhound 
effect also may explain why less potential terrorism reporting occurs.  The officers in 
question may have focused on following leads relevant to a particular investigation and 
consciously or subconsciously avoided other distractions.  A collection system that relies 
on individuals from varied disciplines to self-report information may unnecessarily limit 
itself to only the most egregious or obvious terrorism information.   
3. Knowledge Management in Policing 
Another rapidly growing trend in policing is the recognition that an agency must 
know what it knows.  Law enforcement departments recognize that as a result of COP 
and ILP, they are becoming accumulators of vast amounts of data which they are unable 
to process quickly and efficiently.  Knowledge management is the management of the 
department’s intellectual assets held by its employees, databases, corporate history, and 
expertise.74  Knowledge management in policing recognizes that police culture 
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emphasizes individual knowledge collection as experience and expertise.75 Knowledge 
management therefore can be the untapped reservoir of information within police 
departments.  This reservoir could represent the intelligence base of the department and 
the vital clues needed to unravel the next plot.  Leveraging that reservoir requires tapping 
into the knowledge base of the individuals and managing that information in an efficient 
and effective manner.  The study of knowledge management is uniquely suited to the 
challenge of focusing this reservoir toward fusion centers in an effort to leverage the 
collection information.   
To assist in retrieving information, software designers have created programs to 
manage information and catalog it for retrieval. Technology solutions, however, 
presuppose the existence of information technology systems and automation.  This 
continues to be an issue for smaller police departments and is a reoccurring theme 
throughout this paper.  While the majority of departments embraced COP as a practical 
way to connect with the public they serve, resource and funding limitations have stymied 
smaller departments from taking advantage of ILP and the ensuing dilemma of 
knowledge management.  Insomuch as this situation effects up to 91% of the law 
enforcement departments with officers numbering fewer then 50, the lack of ILP and 
knowledge management will have a significant effect on the overall amount of collection 
data reaching the fusion centers.   
To tap into the reservoir of intelligence locked up in these police departments 
across the country, officials must create avenues for them to connect to the fusion centers.   
Many of these departments have dated technology systems from the 1980s and 1990s 
which limit their ability to access their own intelligence base.  Some of the departments 
require policy and procedural changes to increase record keeping and documentation.  
Still others simply need resources to advance police operations into intelligence 
operations and analytical record keeping.     
To increase connectivity and standardization, the Department of Justice 
established the Information Systems Technology Enhancement Project (ISTEP) to assist 
 
75 Chavez, “Knowledge Management in Policing,” 5. 
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departments with knowledge management.  ISTEP suggests three areas of guidance: 1) 
reconsider the domain of police related information; 2) collect new types of data; and 3) 
limit analysis to data that is timely and relevant.76 Without standardization of data and 
digitization of information, smaller departments will be left out in the cold when it comes 
to data fusion.   
 
76 Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Police Department, 
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IV.  THE FUTURE OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 
A.  FUSION CENTERS  
There is evidence of a fledgling national intelligence fusion process.  At least 
forty two of the fifty states have created state fusion centers.77  The concept of 
information fusion has emerged as the fundamental process to facilitate the information 
sharing between federal, state and local entities.78 These centers are attempting to link 
and exploit information gathered by state and local organizations.   
The Department of Justice has defined fusion centers as an “effective and efficient 
mechanism to exchange information and intelligence.”79  Phillip Leggiere describes 
fusion centers as “a way to enable law enforcement, public safety, emergency 
management, and other partners to mutually aggregate, analyze, and disseminate criminal 
and terrorist related information.”80   
The goal of fusion centers, according to Leggiere, is to “provide a mechanism 
through which government law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector can 
come together with a common purpose and improve the ability to safeguard our 
homeland.”81  Fusion centers are expected to allow federal, state and local entities to 
better prevent acts of terrorism and provide necessary data for the preparation of natural 
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81 Ibid., 4. 
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expertise from homeland security, public safety, private sector, law enforcement, critical 
infrastructure and intelligence entities.83  Information from these entities improves the 
situational awareness picture.   
Fusion centers work by inputting data sets from a broad spectrum of information 
encompassing the varied disciplines described above.84 The idea, according to Eben 
Kaplan of the Council on Foreign Relations is that “the next time a would-be terrorist on 
a government watch list is pulled over for speeding, the officer at the scene will have the 
information he needs.”85   
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Fusion centers could be the key conduit or critical node for sharing federal 
information to the local level.86 Charlie Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer for DHS 
describes fusion centers as a “co-equal network, not just computers and wires, but a rapid 
analytic movement.”87 Eventually, DHS envisions a “network of networks” that would 
function as a virtual national fusion center.  A virtual fusion center, linking the country’s 
fusion centers through technology and standardization.88 This virtual fusion center, 
network of networks, will be able to push and pull information between federal, state and 
local players.89  DHS has devoted over $380 million dollars to the project and expects to 
place intelligence officers and analysts in every fusion center to assist in the process.90  
Hoping to foster up to 70 fusion centers across the United States, DHS envisions every 
major urban and metropolitan area, including every state, to be represented.91  The 
concept is for each individual fusion center to serve the community it represents by 
addressing the needs and requirements unique to that community.  To qualify for grants 
however, the fusion centers must conform to certain requirements designed to achieve 
connectivity and networking capabilities.92
While most parties agree that much has been achieved at the federal, state and 
local level with respect to fusion centers, Ambassador Thomas McNamara, Program 
Manager, Information Sharing Environment (ISE), Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, concludes that although much has been accomplished, much has to be done.  
 
86 Kaplan, “Fusion Centers,” 2. 
87 Statement of Assistant Secretary Charles E. Allen, National Fusion Center Conference, Destin 
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88 Statement of Secretary Michael Chertoff, National Fusion Center Conference, Destin Florida, 
March 6, 2007. 
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91 Interview of Deputy Assistant Secretary Jack Tomarchio by  the author, Destin, Florida, March 6, 
2007. 
92 Fusion Center Guidelines, 3. 
 41
                                                
According to McNamara, “We have in 5 years reached the end of the beginning.”93 
Obstacles remain a constant reminder of the challenge ahead.  For instance, in spite of the 
significant investment by DHS and state and local entities, funding continues to be a 
problem.  Capital investments by DHS does not guarantee maintenance and daily 
expenses will be sustained by cash strapped state and local governments.  Training also is 
an issue.  Most fusion centers are technology intensive, requiring highly trained 
personnel.94 Information sharing efforts also suffer from constant turf wars amongst the 
agencies.  These battles hamper the collaborative environment and stymies analytical 
work product.95 Also, analytical cadres require advanced education and years of 
experience to become subject matter experts.   Expert analysts take years to mature. 
Expanding national analytical resources will take many years.  According to Ambassador 
McNamara, fusion centers are also not envisioned as part of the intelligence 
community.96 This could prove to be confusing, since fusion center information is vital to 
the domestic intelligence analysis used in a national domestic intelligence estimate.  If the 
fusion centers are to be rapid analytic centers capable of information sharing greater then 
that of the computers and wires as DHS envisions, federal, state and local entities will 
have to overcome these obstacles. 
B.  STATE AND LOCAL HUMINT IN FUSION CENTERS 
While the role of the federal government in providing funding, creating guidelines 
and national strategies is clear, the role of state and local partners in the fusion center 
process is less defined.  Comments from state and local experts provided to the Lessons 
Learned Information Sharing project sponsored by DHS showed that there was a 
perception by state and locals that they were receiving information from the federal 
 
93 Statement of Ambassador Thomas McNamara, Program Manager, ISE, ODNI, National Fusion 
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government without being asked for information in return.97  Also, the survey showed 
that in the absence of clear guidance from the federal government, state and locals were 
developing their own networks to share information among themselves.98  The report 
concluded that DHS should “focus on leveraging existing programs and seek to integrate 
those programs into a cohesive, national information and intelligence sharing 
architecture.”99
Since reports have concluded that state and local information is vital to predicting 
future attacks, fusion centers lacking this type of information is a threat to national 
security.  State and local information provide the indicators needed for tactical warning 
currently unavailable to national intelligence assessments.  The “push and pull” effect 
described by Secretary Chertoff at the moment seems to be more push and less pull.  This 
is further supported by the report issued by the International Chiefs of Police in 2005.  
The Chiefs concluded that the federal Government had not coordinated its information 
sharing policies with state and local officials.100  The now famous quote that “All 
terrorism is local” was born of this report.101  The need for fusion center information to 
contain more state and local data is obvious and yet both data and anecdotal information 
suggests adequate state and local information is not reaching the fusion centers.    
One possible explanation for the lack of critical law enforcement collection 
information in fusion centers is that most law enforcement is comprised of small 
departments which are not fully computerized.  In 2000, there were 17,784 departments, 
including 12,666 police departments and 3,070 sheriff’s departments.102  According to 
the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 75% of the state and local law 
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enforcement departments had fewer then 24 officers.103  In 1994, 91% of departments 
employed fewer then 50 sworn police officers.104  Most local police departments, 
therefore, are small: 50% employ fewer then 10 commissioned officers.105  Since small 
departments are plagued by funding limitations which prevent wide usage of computer 
systems, automation and intelligence specialization, it is logical to assume most of these 
smaller departments are isolated from the urban, technology driven fusion centers.106  
Much of the information needed by fusion centers, specifically the community 
oriented policing information from small town America, is housed in these small 
departments that do not have technological access to fusion centers. Unfortunately, 
informant tips, field investigation reports, lead and community liaison information is 
trapped in paper-driven, informal law enforcement networks throughout small town and 
rural America.   Information from these departments must be relayed by traditional 
methods such as direct telephone contact, law enforcement liaison activities or intra-
department threat assessment and survey channels.  Absent specific analytical systems 
and processes, the majority of law enforcement collection data is stove piped within the 
departments themselves.   
Interviews of law enforcement executives representing 27 small, medium and 
large agencies revealed varied collection and intelligence dissemination programs 
throughout the United States. 107  For example, data suggests that large law enforcement 
departments, defined as those comprised of 1000 officers or more, have adopted 
community oriented policing programs, have moved to intelligence led policing 
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strategies, have created intelligence units to support the strategies and may engage in 
criminal intelligence gathering activities as permitted by their respective state and local 
laws.   
Medium-sized departments, defined as those comprised of more then 100 sworn 
officers, but less then 1,000, have adopted community oriented policing programs, but are 
struggling with intelligence led policing because they do not for the most part have the 
resources for intelligence units and analytical cadres.  Medium-sized departments rarely 
conduct intelligence operations outside of support of special events in their area.   
Small to medium departments, defined as having less then 100 sworn officers, 
have or are in the process of adopting community oriented policing programs, but have 
little or no intelligence function whatsoever and are dependent on their colleagues for 
intelligence.  
Smaller departments, defined as those with 24 sworn officers or less, may use 
community oriented policing programs, have little or no digitized intelligence 
information outside of simple report writing and criminal record information, and rely 
almost exclusively on other departments for intelligence and analytical products.  
The above analysis suggests that a significant amount of information is stove 
piped among medium and small police departments that may contribute to the overall 
intelligence and analytical picture needed to thwart the next major terrorist attack.  The 
information is trapped in department records, unit reports, paper reporting systems, 
individual officer records, and the officers themselves.  Releasing this information will 
require organizational, cultural, technological and budgetary solutions. 
For this reason, the Department of Justice’s Intelligence Sharing Plan 
recommends all departments automate incident based record keeping, join regional 
information systems such as the FBI Law Enforcement Online and utilize the latest 
version of the Global Justice Extensive Markup Language Data Model.  In this way, 
small departments can digitize their information in the most modern data standard, 
capable of interoperability with other participating agencies, and thereby connect to the  
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fusion network of networks.  Although DOJ has invested significant funds to create the 
XML format and provide software, funding is not yet available for hardware at the local 
level. 
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) recognizes the 
challenges of smaller departments.  The IACP has teamed up with the Department of 
Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance to create the Smaller Police Department Technical 
Assistance Program (SPTAP).  The SPTAP provides services, support and training to 
smaller police departments.  The SPTAP also publishes Best Practices Guides to assist 
the Chiefs of smaller departments.  In spite of these efforts, funding and resource 
shortfalls continues to hamper intelligence gathering and sharing at the smaller 
department level. 
C.  THE XML REVOLUTION 
The Global Justice Extensible Markup Language (XML) Standard is a computer 
language designed to encode each item of the language with the meaning of the item 
itself.  The markup language is a mechanism that allows the object to be coded with a tag 
that identifies the meaning of the object to the computer thereby providing “smart” 
capabilities.108  These capabilities provide extensive options including search, relational 
and content specific programming.  The XML standard is sanctioned by World Wide 
Web consortiums and compatible with Internet protocols.109 The Global Justice XML 
Data Model (GJXDM) was designed for law enforcement and public safety professionals 
to share information using a common data language, and thereby remove the burden from 
each individual agency of creating or adopting standards.   
There are three primary components of GJXDM including the Data Dictionary, 
Data model and Component Reuse Repository.110 The Data Dictionary contains language 
definitions which standardize their use in the schema.  The Data Model organizes data 
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schema for use by multiple agencies. And, the Component Reuse Repository database 
houses the data to be accessed by all authorized users.111 These tools eliminate the need 
for agencies to create interfaces for data sharing. It is the vocabulary for law enforcement 
to communicate with each other technologically. According to the Department of Justice, 
the ensuing database is designed to “arm everyone across the justice and public safety 
communities with the most accurate and up-to-date data to make the very best 
decisions.”112  
Combining XML technology with the Department of Justice’s Global Justice 
XML Data Model gives law enforcement a common language standard and system for 
communicating effectively.  The XML technology facilitates metadata acquisition and 
relational analysis necessary for sophisticated intelligence products.  The Data Model 
protocol advances the technology and makes it accessible to smaller departments which 
lack the resources to create and finance expensive analytical software technology.  Used 
in tandem, the law enforcement community has a software standard for communicating 
together and linking criminal justice information. 
While the XML and GJXDM provide the “rules of the road” for collaboration 
communication, they are not the road itself.  Data platforms have been created to provide 
users with portals that serve as “ramps” to get on and off the intelligence information 
super-highway.  These platforms include the FBI’s National Data Exchange, DHS’s 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), Regional Information Sharing System 
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1.  National Data Exchange  
According to the FBI, The National Data Exchange (NDEx) is tasked with 
“providing local, state, tribal and federal law enforcement with a system to collect, 
process, and disseminate criminal and investigative data to be used for law enforcement 
sharing.”113  
To accomplish this mission, the FBI is developing a system that will collect and 
process crime data in support of investigations, crime analyses, law enforcement 
administration, strategic and tactical operations, and national security responsibilities. An 
important feature of the project is that NDEx will be built on existing FBI run 
infrastructure supporting the National Crime Information Center and the Law 
Enforcement Online (LEO) programs already functioning successfully and widely 
accepted by law enforcement.114
The goals of the NDEx program are to “design and implement an information 
sharing system, enhance partnerships, provide increased access to information, provide a 
one-stop-shopping capability for law enforcement information sharing, provide access to 
more sophisticated tools to a wide spectrum of law enforcement, become a predictive 
crime modeling tool, provide link analysis capabilities, and transcend local, state, tribal 
and federal jurisdictions.” 115
NDEx’s little brother and regional component, RDEx, has been piloted in four 
areas including Seattle, St Louis, Jacksonville, and Washington, D.C.  The RDEx system 
deploys several technologies to the federal, state, local and tribal agencies participating in 
the network. RDEx includes the ability to search full text, unstructured criminal data 
(Google type searches), link analysis tools, and geospatial mapping functionality.  
According to GovExec.com, “Information on the system includes the identities of 
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vehicles and weapons, addresses and phone numbers. The program allows cases to be 
plotted on maps so geographical patterns can be identified.”116
The outcome of NDEx is still in question.  The program is a multiyear phased 
project in three installments.  The first phase involved modeling and prototypes which 
could be tested and evaluated.  That phase was completed in 2005.  Phase 2 is a 28 month 
incremental phase which involves feedback and pilot implementation.  The program is in 
the midst of Phase 2.  Phase Three is designed to provide additional capabilities and 
scope to the program.  Phase Three hopes to expand the program into new and yet to be 
determined aspects of law enforcement sharing.  The program platform is designed to 
accept additional aspects and capabilities.  Phase Three is scheduled to be completed in 
the 2008–2009 time frames. 
The NDEx program, including Phase Three, has plans for developing a systems 
approach to the operation, and maintenance of several interconnected IT and supporting 
applications. The program, as envisioned, will also be a “fusion point for the correlation 
of nationally-based criminal justice information with certain national security data.”117
To assess the effectiveness and expansion potential for the program, the following 
criteria were analyzed. 
a. Scalability 
To promote a national program capable of interconnecting tens of 
thousands of law enforcement agencies, NDEx will have to incorporate scalability to its 
expansion plans.  In this regard, the project relies on two important features.  First, the 
system is built upon the CJIS infrastructure which is the largest crime database network 
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system in the world.118 The CJIS platform already supports the National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC), Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR), and Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (IAFIS) fingerprint identification systems used by the majority of 
law enforcement nationwide.119  Second, the system is designed to accept expansion 
including local systems, regional systems such as Law enforcement Information 
Exchange (LiNX), and LEO.  Phase Three envisions specific additions of components 
and IT systems.  The infrastructure has been designed to accept modular expansion and 
therefore scores high on scalability.   
b.  Interoperability 
As a result of several drivers after the events of September 11, 2001, 
including Presidential Executive Orders, Congressional legislation, FBI initiatives and 
post 9/11 recommendations, the Department of Justice created the Law Enforcement 
Information Sharing Program (LEISP).120 The key strategy of the LEISP was to promote 
uniformity and accessibility through a “One DOJ” policy of standardized IT information 
sharing network.121 The system provides law enforcement with one entry point via the 
LEISP Exchange Specification (LEXS).122
As a result of this network interface, law enforcement has ease of access 
and interoperability via internet connectivity. Using various portals such as LEO or RISS, 
law enforcement can access the RDEx network of shared data including text searches, 
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c.  Open vs. Proprietary Technology 
Another benefit of the LEISP is the use of open standards such as XML, 
Web Services and NIEM schema (version 0.3).  These open standards allow any law 
enforcement system to participate in the RDEx portion of the information sharing 
environment.  This has resulted in a common language for sharing information among 
differing computer systems, such as the Global Justice XML Data Dictionary described 
above. This standard was developed with information sharing in mind, in collaboration 
with state and local law enforcement and participation from the IT industry.124
d.  Variables 
Variables include the costs, governance issues, the technology itself and 
perhaps more importantly, the acceptance by the law enforcement community.  Because 
the system relies on voluntary participation by law enforcement to upload their 
proprietary reports and access the system, the program’s success relies on the degree to 
which it is accepted.  
To contend with these issues associated with data collections, the FBI 
turned to the leading law enforcement partnerships for guidance in developing 
governance and acceptance conventions. These organizations include: International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs Association, the Major Cities 
Chiefs Association, and the Major County Sheriff's Association.  A joint Position 
Statement dated August 15, 2005, was released by these organizations, which set forth 
three requirements for success: 
Development of a Statement of Requirements designed with local law 
enforcement input and utilization in mind. It recommends that the requirements should be 
validated through representatives of their associations and coordinated by the FBI CJIS 
Advisory Board (APB) 
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After an agreed upon Statement of Requirements is completed, a Funding 
Projections document that reflects the costs for each phase of the project to the agencies 
needs to be prepared 
Based upon the Statement of Requirements and Funding Projections, the 
FBI and the Department of Justice will need to formalize a process that will result in a 
consistent message about the Project's mission, goals, strategy, and status.125  
The CJIS Division of the FBI is responsible for the NDEx/RDEx program.  
CJIS, along with the CJIS Advisory Board, have committed to working with the joint 
advisory law enforcement panels and are implementing their recommendations.  
Representatives from CJIS are currently conducting presentations to state and local law 
enforcement entities throughout the United States in an effort to educate the community 
and obtain feedback.  Consequently, there is an effort underway to provide a consistent 
message about NDEx’s mission, goals, strategy and status. 
The NDEx/RDEx project was born out of the intelligence chaos of 9/11.  
The project was designed specifically as a national law enforcement sharing mechanism.  
To benefit from consistent feedback and modification, it was designed as a multi-phased, 
long term project.  The project is enhanced by intentional scalability and open standards, 
with off-the-shelf software such as link analysis and iMap features. The project is 
vulnerable, in that it is completely susceptible to variables which affect law enforcement 
acceptance of the program.  Lack of acceptance by the state and local law enforcement 
community would render the system useless.  Additional obstacles include funding for 
connectivity and user equipment costs and governance issues.  To overcome these issues, 
the FBI is promoting the project, created advisory panels to assist with user issues 
regarding costs and governance and initiated pilot projects in various parts of the country 
to establish a successful track record.  While the potential for the program is significant, 
the ambitious scale and goals of the project remain as yet unfulfilled.  
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2.  Homeland Security Information Network 
The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a computer based system 
platform designed to increase information sharing between federal, state, local and tribal 
entities.  The HSIN systems link state and urban areas with DHS intelligence systems.  
The network helps provide situational awareness, collaboration, analytical capabilities 
and real time information sharing.126 HSIN is used by DHS’ Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis to post intelligence related products.127  DHS has created several sub systems 
including HSIN-Intel designed to share unclassified intelligence to consumers already 
using the HSIN network.128  The HSIN-S, a secret network, provided a classified avenue 
for network sharing. The HSIN-S eventually transitioned into the Homeland Security 
Data Network (HSDN) providing additional classified capabilities and modeled after the 
military Secret Internet Protocol Network.129  
In February 2004, Groove Networks announced they had partnered with DHS to 
use Groove Networks Collaboration Technology to power the HSIN network.130 Groove 
Networks, a leading office software producer, is best known for their collaboration 
software which facilitates multiple users in a virtual work environment.  At the time, then 
Secretary Ridge predicted that the HSIN/Groove system would allow ever increasing 
expansion of federal, state and urban area information sharing through sophisticated 
technology.131   
 
126 Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Information Network Webpage,”  
https://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc1156888108137.shtm  (accessed May 29, 2007).  
127 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland security, Subcommittee on Intelligence 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Statement of Charlie Allen, The Homeland Security Information 
Network: An Update on DHS Information Sharing Efforts, September 13, 2006, 4. Available Online: 
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128 Statement of Charlie Allen, The Homeland Security information Network, 5. 
129 Ibid., 7. 
130 Groove Network, “Groove software is core component of HSIN; Demo at Homeland Security 
Conference Today” (Beverly, Mass., February 26, 2004). Available Online: 
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In June 2006, the DHS Inspector general released a report critical of the 
implementation of HSIN.132 The report concluded DHS had failed to take into account 
several important steps in the effective planning and implementation of HSIN.133  The 
report recommended communication with HSIN users to clarify mission and vision; 
provide clear guidance regarding data flow; standard operating instructions; obtain 
system requirements from users and create performance metrics for the system.  134
Similarly, in May 2007, The Government Accounting Office (GAO) also 
criticized DHS for not coordinating the design and implementation of HSIN with already 
existing platforms such as Regional Information Sharing System (RISS).135 The GAO 
report concluded a major factor in HSIN’s flaws was the Department’s rush to get the 
system operational.  As a result, the report concluded DHS runs the risk of duplicating or 
interfering with effective existing information sharing systems.136   
Since the reports, several entities have criticized HSIN and other platforms such 
as the RISS and the FBI’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO) for targeting the same state 
and local audience thus creating confusion through duplication.137 The threat is that 
individual departments are sharing information with various uncoordinated systems with 
the mistaken belief that the information is being aggregated.  Ironically, the initial 
impetus for the creation of the system was to eliminate stovepipes in departmental 
databases.  In the rush to stand up systems as quickly as possible, competing systems 
such as HSIN, RISS and LEO are creating the stovepipes they endeavored to eradicate. 
 
132 Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, Homeland Security 
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134 Ibid., 4. 
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DHS contends that by “increasing program management, making greater use of existing 
systems to avoid duplication and providing more usable content, the department can fix 
the problem.”138  
3.  Regional Information Sharing System Program 
The Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Program was created in 1974 to 
support state and local law enforcement intelligence needs through an initial grant from 
the U.S. Department of Justice.139  The program has expanded over the years to include 
six regional intelligence centers which provide a variety of intelligence functions.  The 
backbone of the program is RISS.net, a secure web-based network accessible to members 
through telephone or internet.140  RISS.net provides users with a network for 
communicating law enforcement information across jurisdictional lines.  Riss.net offers 
resources such as the RISS bulletin board, databases, RISS center web pages, RISS 
search engine, and other center resources. RISS also provides analytical services 
including telephone, financial and data analysis in the form of analytical products to its 
members via the RISS.net.141 Other services offered by RISS include investigative 
support, specialized equipment loans, covert purchase funding, technical assistance and 
training.142 RISS centers are located in Newtown, Pennsylvania, Springfield Missouri, 
Franklin, Massachusetts, Nashville, Tennessee, Phoenix, Arizona and Sacramento, 
California.143 Typical targets of RISS members are terrorism, drug trafficking, violent 
crimes, and organized crime.144  
 
138 Mary Mosquera, “DHS vows to fix information network,” FCW.COM, May 28, 2007, 1. Available 
Online: http://www.fcw.com/article102798-05-28-07-PrintandprintLayout  (accessed, June 3, 2007).  
139 Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Program Brief: Regional Information Sharing 
Systems Program, April 2002, 2. Available Online: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA accessed 6/9/07 
(accessed June 3, 2007).    
140 Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Program Brief: Regional Information Sharing 
Systems Program, 3. 
141 Ibid, 3. 
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143 Ibid., 4. 
144 Department of Justice, Regional Information Sharing System, RISS Overview. Available Online: 
http://www.rissinfo.com/overview.htm (accessed June 9, 2007). 
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Since the initiation of RISS, membership has grown to almost 7,100 law 
enforcement agencies spanning the entire United States.145 Recently, in 2002, RISS 
added the Automated Trusted Information Exchange Network (ATIX) designed to link 
agencies and other data platforms.  RISS-ATIX is offered as a platform to connect fusion 
centers to the RISS network.  Also, the FBI’s LEO network was recently linked to the 
RISS network further expanding the program.146  
Speaking before the House of Representatives, Captain William Harris of the 
Delaware State Police stated that the “system (RISS) is both robust and user friendly, and 
contains more relevant, reliable, and timely law enforcement and homeland security 
information that is actionable for the line level law enforcement personnel.”147 Harris 
criticized the bureaucracy of multiple systems as confusing and inefficient for law 
enforcement.  RISS has the benefits of long time credibility with law enforcement, far 
reach through its extensive network and extensive capabilities and varied products.  
Detractors of the RISS network argue that it is law enforcement centric.  RISS-ATIX, 
however, has been able to link the RISS network with non-law enforcement systems 
giving the RISS program more information depth and reach into the community.  
D.  DATA WAREHOUSES-LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE  
The Law Enforcement Information Exchange (LInX) system is an example of a 
regional data warehouse that unites several separate law enforcement data sets using 
common communication standards.  The original contract was awarded to Northrop 
Grumman Corporation in 2004 and built upon an early FBI and St. Louis law 
enforcement model of data sharing.148LInX is a series of data warehouses obtained from  
 
 
145 Department of Justice, Regional Information Sharing System, RISS Overview, 2. 
146 William Harris, “Homeland Security Information Network: Moving Past the Missteps Toward 
Better Information Sharing,” May 10, 2007, 2. Available Online:   
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070510132121-04354.pdf (accessed June 9, 2007).     
147 Ibid., 2. 
148Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Law Enforcement Information Exchange, About LInX, 1. 
Available Online: http://www.ncis.navy.mil/linx/about_linx.html (accessed June 2, 2007).  
participating law enforcement agencies providing unprecedented access by agency users.  
LInX has been implemented in five regions including Florida/Georgia, Hawaii, Texas, 
Virginia and Washington.149
The data sent to the LInX warehouse is comprised of incident reports, case 
records, computer aided dispatch events, citations, mug shots, pawn data, and free text 
investigative notes.150 The information provided by participating agencies is processed 
and normalized.  The information is then ready for retrieval by authorized users.  In the 
case of the FBI, the RDEx platform described above is used to transmit FBI data from  
FBI servers to the LInX warehouse. The warehouse provides federal, state and local 
investigators with fingertip access to each others investigative information heretofore 
unavailable in any one location. 




Figure 5.   Law Enforcement Information Exchange Data Warehouse. 
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Overview, 1. Available Online:  http://www.ncis.navy.mil/linx/technical.html (accessed June 2, 2007).  
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June 2, 2007).  
 56
 57
                                                
The data warehouse becomes a tool for breaking down barriers and creating trust.  
Information housed in individual department record stores is difficult to access through 
informal networks. By storing information in common data warehouses, individual 
officers can access stove piped information previously inaccessible.  Successes associated 
with the system help break down walls of mistrust and encourage collaborative activity.  
Cases which have utilized the system create investigative connections and leads that 
would have been impossible without the collaborative power of the system.152
The above described information sharing systems are just a few of the platforms 
and warehouses available to law enforcement and the public safety community.  Each 
system offers users specific capabilities.  In each case, the stated goal of the platform is 
the broad exchange of information.  Users report, however, that competing systems 
hamper information sharing and obstruct the very premise of the system.  Standards, such 
as the Global Justice XML Standard, emphasize the necessity to create technologies 
which communicate with each other and avoid duplication of effort.  Governance and 
coordination bodies such as the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Working Group 
are necessary to ensure that platforms created to maximize sharing conform to existing 
strategies and protocols.  Without governing bodies, departments risk implementing 
costly systems which may hamper instead of expand information sharing. 
E.  CASE STUDY: FUSION CENTER PROCESS IN NORTH FLORIDA 
Recently, individuals from various law enforcement and intelligence agencies met 
and formed an intelligence exploratory committee to study the fusion process in North 
Florida.  During the spring of 2007, intelligence practitioners from federal, state and local 
departments studied the intelligence flow and sharing process between the agencies.  As a 
result, the exploratory committee created a document outlining a proposed future 
information and intelligence system in anticipation of a formal regional strategy.153  The 
 
152 Alan Joch, “Long Arm of the Law,” FCW.COM, August 29, 2005, 4. Available Online: 
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purpose of the document was described as the formulation of a “general plan to increase 
communication between numerous information and intelligence resources within the 
Northeast Florida Region.”154
The exploratory committee recognized that intelligence sharing had occurred in 
North Florida at various levels between varying entities for many years.155  The 
Committee identified sharing mechanisms in place which had served specific historical 
intelligence requirements.  For example, in the late 1990s, the High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program had funded and created the North East Florida 
Investigative Support Center (NeFISC) to analyze and promote criminal intelligence 
sharing amongst law enforcement agencies, specifically in drug related investigations. 
Also, in the 1990s, the FBI had created the Jacksonville Joint Terrorism Task Force to 
address terrorism related investigations in the Division.  Similarly, after the events of 
September 11, 2001, the State of Florida created the Regional Domestic Security Task 
Force to assist with Homeland Security law enforcement and security related information 
sharing. These entities were created to increase information sharing and in reaction to 
specific historical threats to the area. 
The Committee also recognized that while these groups were designed to serve 
varying purposes, they comprised key elements of intelligence gathering in the region.  
Other groups, such as the Intelligence Unit of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO), the 
Jacksonville Port’s Joint Maritime Advance Scheduling and Targeting Team (JMASTT), 
the FBI Field Intelligence Group (FIG), and the newly created Regional Intelligence 
Fusion Center (RIFC) rounded out the intelligence and analysis entities in the region.  
The study, therefore, sought to identify a fusion plan that would coordinate all these 
entities and thereby leverage their joint capabilities.   
Originally, the Committee had envisioned recommending a consolidation of 
resources and capabilities under one roof in a centrally located fusion center.  Logistical 
obstacles such as long term leases, varying security and protocols, and resource shortfalls 
 
154 Information and Intelligence Sharing Strategy for Northeast Florida, 3. 
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Florida Intelligence Steering Committee. 
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made this option unrealistic.  The Committee instead, created a virtual fusion system plan 
to unite the entities under a virtual roof comprised of steering and governance oversight.  
The plan calls for a Steering Committee, Fusion System Working Committee and a 
centralized point for dissemination of joint products and intelligence. 156  
Although the fusion system is still in progress, the plan calls for a strategy to 
facilitate the sharing of criminal intelligence, define ways to increase coordination, 
enable unified sharing of information and produce topic specific threat assessments for all 
member agencies in the area.157  The plan suggests the unification of technology through 
the LInX system of data warehousing and a centralization of intelligence through the 
Northeast Florida Investigative Support Center (NeFISC).  Each of the other intelligence 
centers will feed the virtual warehouse and be able to retrieve from it. The resulting 
system will have the benefits of expanded intelligence access while respecting the limited 
resources and flexibility of the component entities. 
By emphasizing information sharing over construction of additional centers, and 
technology sharing over acquisition of new computers and wires, the proposed fusion 
system promotes effective intelligence sharing within the boundaries of limited 
government.  This is accomplished through information management and collaborative 
governance. Central to the process is the cooperation and vitality of the interested parties.   
The key to success therefore, revolves around the group’s commitment and desire to 
achieve mutual information sharing versus a mandated process forced upon unwilling or 
disinterested parties.  Without the willingness of the partners to engage and commit in a 
collaborative process, which emphasizes voluntary sharing of key data, the committee 
concluded that fusion could not be reached through any amount of technology, resources 
or authority.  
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V.  OBSTACLES TO DOMESTIC COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
A.  OBSTACLES 
Expansion of covert HUMINT is time consuming and manpower intensive.  In 
2004, then Director of the CIA, George Tenet, commented that even with his ambitious 
plan to rebuild the clandestine service, it would take the CIA at least five years to grow 
its spy program.159 Furthermore, even with ambitious new programs, there are no 
guarantees that expanded budgets and long-term plans will produce timely and relevant 
HUMINT.  Some observers even suggest that no amount of money or time will generate 
sources that can report on the most difficult targets, such as the Al Qaeda inner circle.160 
Domestic agencies are faced with a similar challenge in penetrating cells operating within 
the United States. Despite the expansion in human source programs, federal authorities 
may still lack the ability to significantly increase HUMINT.161
Unfortunately, domestic collection expansion has lagged behind for several 
reasons.  First, the majority of the intelligence community was designed and concentrated 
on foreign collection.  Only a small part of the overall intelligence community capability 
is devoted to domestic collection.  For example, at least 85% of the intelligence budget is 
controlled by the Department of Defense.162  This includes the National Security Agency, 
the National Reconnaissance Office and the Defense Intelligence Agency.  As described 
above, under existing legislation, none of these agencies is permitted domestic collection 
outside of Department of Justice and DHS involvement.  The Central Intelligence 
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Agency is similarly prohibited.163  The remaining domestic intelligence branches, which 
have responsibility for domestic collection, share less than 15% of the overall intelligence 
budget. 
Second, domestic laws and procedures restrict domestic collection in support of 
civil liberty protections. As a result of 1960s era intelligence abuses, the Church 
Committee in 1975 recommended significant restrictions to domestic collection 
investigations.164 In response, in 1978, the Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act to restrict domestic intelligence wiretapping by the FBI.165  The 
National Security Act of 1947 and the Intelligence Reform Act of 2005 also provided 
specific delineation of domestic and foreign collection.166   These acts specifically 
restricted Department of defense agencies and the CIA from domestic collection 
activities except under limited circumstances.  Taken as a whole, these legislative acts 
significantly restrict domestic collection for intelligence purposes and delineated the FBI 
as primarily responsible for intelligence investigations in the United States. None of this 
legislation however, affects the criminal jurisdictions of any agency to conduct criminally 
predicated investigations using authorized evidence-gathering tools. 
Third, since only a small portion of the intelligence community engages in 
domestic collection, these efforts have a comparatively small effect on the increase in 
overall collection.  For example, only a portion of the FBI is dedicated to intelligence 
collection activities within the National Security Branch of the agency.167 Likewise, the 
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DHS Intelligence Section is relatively new and still in the formative stages.168  The 
combined effort of these branches is still relatively small in comparison to the 
Department of Defense and CIA resources devoted to foreign collection. The relative 
expansion of these branches, however ambitious, remains a small percentage of the 
overall intelligence community effort. 
Fourth, agencies with domestic collection responsibilities have invested their 
scarce resources on analysis and dissemination, the segments of the intelligence cycle 
where they are most likely to achieve results.  For instance, since September 11, 2001 the 
FBI has doubled the number of its analysts and tripled its linguists.169  Yet, the 9/11 
Commission found that although the FBI had made progress in redirecting its efforts at 
analysis, “systemic collection work is left undone.” 170  Also, in an article titled America 
Needs More Spies, published July 10, 2003, a group of six FBI and CIA intelligence 
experts collaborated to discuss the lack of domestic human intelligence collection.171  
They concluded that to prevent terrorism, terrorist organizations must be penetrated and 
that the United States did not have adequate human intelligence to do the job.172  While 
they recognized that efforts were underway to increase analysis, they concluded more 
HUMINT was not forthcoming.173   
For all these reasons, the intelligence community has seen a comparatively small 
increase in domestic collection, while other segments of the intelligence production cycle 
have been expanded.  Since overall intelligence production relies on collection as one of 
its most important aspects, the lack of expansion in domestic collection will have a bottle 
neck effect on efforts to increase domestic intelligence production.   
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B.  OUTLOOK 
One mechanism for increasing domestic collection is to exploit the existing state 
and local HUMINT resources described above.  This strategy benefits from several 
advantages.  For example, local law enforcement already operates tens of thousands of 
criminal informants who would be enormously expensive and time consuming to develop 
and recruit from scratch.  These informants are operated within existing legal guidelines 
and do not require new or expansive legal authorities to create.  While state and local 
jurisdictions might limit non-predicated intelligence gathering, predicated information 
could still be very useful in terrorist related investigations. 
Moreover, the growing trend of Community Oriented Policing in American law 
enforcement, which by some estimates is used in over 80% of police departments, is a 
form of overt collection.  Law enforcement has adopted these techniques for engaging the 
community in dialogue and communication in an effort to identify and reduce crime at 
the neighborhood level.    As a result, police officers are becoming overt collectors of 
intelligence in their communities. Recently, the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police concluded in their annual report that their efforts at community policing was the 
answer to policing terrorism in America since at its core terrorism is a local problem and 
could be identified through community policing techniques.174 By leveraging the covert 
and overt collection capabilities of state and local law enforcement overall domestic 
collection could be expanded without creating new federal agencies and programs. 
Furthermore, the state and local law enforcement community scale is huge 
compared to the existing federal domestic resources; i.e., over 800,000 state and local law 
enforcement officers versus a few thousand Agents assigned to the FBI’s National 
Security Branch and the DHS Intelligence Section.175  The ability to leverage the entire 
law enforcement community would instantly have a significant impact on federal 
resource issues.  This effect, on a much smaller scale, can already been seen in the JTTF 
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Program.  The JTTFs, which currently number approximately 108, employ approximately 
four thousand task force officers which more then doubles the FBI Agent complement.176    
The exploitation of this network, however, does not come without its own 
challenges and roadblocks.  For example, most local law enforcement informants are 
operated by individuals who maintain the majority of the informant’s information.  To 
benefit a national audience, the information would have to be captured electronically. 
Similarly, community policing efforts are often not oriented toward intelligence gathering 
per se and therefore are not well documented.  Consequently, both covert and overt 
HUMINT efforts at the state and local level tend to be focused on specific crime 
problems and may overlook the intelligence windfall potential of collection activity.  This 
is particularly evident in smaller departments which do not have the resources for 
specifically dedicated intelligence units or sophisticated analytical operations 
Unfortunately, information sharing and more importantly intelligence sharing at 
fusion centers, continues to be hampered by classification issues, technology hurdles and 
law enforcement cultural impediments.  Jurisdictional overlap and turf wars have always 
hampered law enforcement information sharing, and continues to frustrate efforts to 
enhance intelligence production at fusion centers.  American law enforcement is 
categorized by many departments at various governmental levels, each with its own 
funding and mission requirements.  These differences often cause difficulties for fusion 
centers.  Varied missions create differing requirements for fusion centers which are 
pulled in different directions trying to satisfy their customers.177  
The conflicting missions and jurisdictions force fusion centers to produce 
“generic” products which appeal to a broad constituency.  The lack of focus associated 
with the process diminishes the value of the products and causes the products to lack 
actionable intelligence. 178 Moreover, fusion centers lack collection managers with the 
authority to task collection and therefore are unable to tailor specific products for the 
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same reason. Also, fusion centers lack production standards and policies.  Therefore, each 
center has adopted its own standards according to the community’s particular needs and 
capabilities.  Although some centers have matured their analytical capabilities, linking 
them on a nationwide basis is hampered by the lack of standardization.  
C.  EMBRACING CHANGE AND ACCEPTANCE 
If acceptance is a key component of the enhanced intelligence process, how do we 
encourage our nation’s law enforcement and domestic intelligence community to change 
the way they look at domestic collection?  The concept of organizational change is a 
well-known discipline within the business and government community.  For example, 
John P. Kotter discusses several stumbling blocks which cause change to fail.179 Among 
these is 1) the necessity to establish urgency for the change; 2) establish and 
communicate a vision; 3) remove obstacles and plan short term wins; and 4) do not 
prematurely declare victory without anchoring the changes.  
The idea of initiating a new frontier of change must be sold to the troops by an 
eager and committed leader.180 Executives often view change as positive improvements 
to the business operation, while employees view change as complicating their lives.181 
Strebel describes the relationship as a personal contract between the employer and 
employee in which reciprocal obligations and mutual commitments are shared.182  In the 
case of domestic collection, law enforcement has certain perceptions regarding 
intelligence and the role of state and local law enforcement.  A central premise to the 
change needed in domestic collection involves altering the perceived reciprocal 
obligations between federal, state and local law enforcement.  Leaders must establish the 
priority for all law enforcement, from Agents and detectives, to cops on the beat, to view 
themselves as collectors of national security information. 
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Successful change occurs when leaders are able to redefine the personal contracts 
and include the changes as beneficial to both parties.  Undefined contract changes 
invariably fail.183  Redefining contracts usually entail significant commitment by the 
leaders, described by Kim and Mauborgne184 as “unforgettable calls for change.” The 
leaders must establish the urgency of the agenda and maintain the energy and force 
behind its necessity. If changes in domestic collection are to succeed, law enforcement 
leaders must energetically accept their roles as leaders of national security intelligence 
collectors through out the country.  
A common misperception regarding change is that workers, or in this case law 
enforcement and public safety officers, are recalcitrant and will not change voluntarily.  
Research shows, however, that organizations have change agents within them, which 
Steven Kelman describes as “change vanguards,” who will push for changes they 
perceive solve problems.185  Committed and motivated leaders who engage change 
vanguards find partners who can initiate rapid change within an organization. State and 
local law enforcement appear eager to take a greater role in the fight against terrorism 
and are ready for properly articulated, intelligence gathering strategy.  For example, 
comments by state and local experts in the Lesson Learned Information Sharing project 
stated that local law enforcement was not being asked enough for information by federal 
authorities.186 This suggests that there are change vanguards within state and local law 
enforcement ready to be tasked for collection information.  
Leaders also must declare the vision with enough clarity to inspire the change 
agents to follow.187   Failure to “set the stage,” as Garvin and Roberto describe, can lead 
to failure.188  It is important to frame the messages and “manage the mood” if change is 
 
183 Strebel, “Why Do Employees Resist Change?” 51. 
184 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, “Tipping Point Leadership,” Harvard Business Review on 
Leading through Change (April 2003):19-44. 
185 Steven Kelman, Unleashing Change (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 39. 
186 Department of Homeland Security, Lessons Learned Information Sharing, LLIS Intelligence and 
Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland Security Intelligence Requirements Process, December 2005, 5.  
187 John P. Kotter, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” 7, 8. 
188 David A. Garvin and Michael A. Roberto, “Change through Persuasion,” Harvard Business 
Review on Leading through Change (February 2005):85-104. 
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to be sustained.189  Leadership roles and authorities in domestic intelligence are 
unfortunately not well defined.  Federalism causes confusion between the roles of the 
federal, state and local government entities.  Insomuch as local collection efforts are 
being targeted in this strategy, local leaders must accept their role as collection managers 
and create the environment described above to initiate change.  Federal intelligence 
leaders will not possess the authority or credibility to reach change vanguards in the state 
and local system.  This mantra must be carried by local leaders, who need to conduct an 
“effective persuasion campaign” as described by Garvin and Roberto, focused at the 
change vanguards within their agencies.  It must be clearly articulated, energetically 
advanced and unequivocally supported, if change is to be achieved. 
Kotter also describes the necessity to remove obstacles and plan short term wins.  
Fusion centers continue to be hampered by classification issues, technology hurdles and 
law enforcement cultural impediments. If change is to be initiated, pre-requisite hurdles 
such as classification and cultural issues that hamper information flow must be alleviated. 
Resolving classification issues could be seen as both removal of obstacles and a short 
term win.  Also, local intelligence successes in fusion center operations, where federal, 
state and local collectors have successfully fused intelligence should be touted and used 
as catalysts for the change process.  Examples of terrorist plots averted or criminal 
investigations solved through collection fusion could also serve in this regard. 
Additionally, Kotter emphasizes the importance of cementing positive changes 
before prematurely declaring victory. Currently, there is a movement to anoint fusion 
centers as the final solution and declare intelligence sharing solved.  While fusion centers 
show great promise for the future, they have only begun to initiate a national intelligence 
process and require substantial improvement before declaring the job done.  Moreover, 
the lack of domestic collection reaching the fusion centers has not been widely discussed 
and requires additional research and study.  Changes to overall information sharing and 
the intelligence process should not be confused with expanding domestic collection and 
the strategy to coordinate same.  
 
189 Garvin and Roberto, “Change through Persuasion,” 96. 
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A strategy to coordinate national collection efforts will require energetic 
leadership, especially at the local level, and change agents willing to initiate the changes.  
It will require buy-in from leaders at all levels and the empowering of frustrated state and 
local patriots slogging through the current inefficient and marginally effective 
intelligence system.  There is evidence of these individual’s existence in many articles 
and journals which cry out for intelligence reform. And, there is untapped leadership in 
the ranks of federal, state and local public servants.  This type of change is possible if the 
clear articulated strategy evokes promise for the fulfillment of mutual obligations for both 
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VI.  A COORDINATED NATIONAL COLLECTION AND 
ANALYSIS STRATEGY TOWARD A NEW HOMELAND 
SECURITY DOCTRINE 
A.  STRATEGY 
A successful strategic plan requires a vision and mission statement supported by 
goals and objectives. Situational analysis combined with strategic thinking produces a 
plan of attack.190  A strategy must also take into account limited resources which 
ultimately dictate the capability of the endeavor.  Maximizing the resources in a 
prioritized fashion increases the likelihood of success. 191  The strategy, to be effective, 
must be achieved within available resources and within cost parameters.  
The vision for domestic collection in the United States is to provide detailed 
situational awareness of domestic threats to the policy makers in a timely and efficient 
manner. The strategic action envisions fusion of federal, state, local, tribal, public and 
private intelligence collection to create a detailed threat picture.  This can be 
accomplished by recording, digitizing and transmitting all federal, state, local, tribal, 
public and private intelligence collection to state and regional fusion centers.  Fusion 
centers would then have the capability to create detailed regional threat assessments.  In 
turn, the regional assessments could be used at the national level to achieve the stated 
vision of national situational awareness.   
The intelligence would encompass granular detail from even the smallest 
communities in the country, instead of current efforts that lack detail due to knowledge 
management limitations. To achieve the stated vision, it will be necessary to invest in 
training, technology and knowledge management software and techniques capable of 
unleashing collection currently stove piped at the local level. Cultural and bureaucratic 
 
190 Bill Birnham, Strategic Thinking  (Douglas Mountain Publishing, Costa Mesa, CA, 2004), 190. 
191 Willie Pietersen, Using Strategic Learning to Create and Sustain Breakthrough Performance (John 
Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, 2002), 40. 
changes will require change agents and leadership at all levels of government.  Funding 




STRATEGIC VISION CONCEPT FOR DOMESTIC COLLECTION 
Vision:  A national intelligence entity provides detailed situational awareness of 
domestic threats to policy makers to prevent major terrorist attacks.  
 
Strategic Actions:  Leverage Domestic state and local law enforcement HUMINT to 
enhance national collection coverage. Create threat assessments using national 
leveraged HUMINT to predict major terrorism events 
 
Goals:   1. Record all HUMINT collection data. 
   2. Digitize all HUMINT collection data. 
   3. Transmit HUMINT collection data to regional fusion centers. 
   4. Create threat assessments using expanded collection of HUMINT. 
   5. Share assessment products nationally. 
 
Objectives: 1. Funding, training, acceptance of HUMINT recording. 
 2. Knowledge Management training, software for enhanced digitization. 
 3. Governance and training in support of sharing regionally. 
 4. Analytical resources and funding in support of regional threat assessments. 
 5. Leadership and commitment in support of national sharing of threat  
     products.  
 
Table 1.   Strategic Vision Concept for Domestic Collection. 
 
1. Blue Ocean Strategy for Domestic Collection Coordination 
Blue Ocean Strategy is a corporate manual designed to describe ways in which 
corporations can expand into uncharted markets and uncontested space.  The bestselling 
book by W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne introduces the concept of corporate 
expansion through the development of innovative ideas that allow corporate entities to 
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rise above current market limitations.  The idea is to create a strategy which 
simultaneously raises value while lowering costs in an uncontested environment. 192
The vision of raising state and local collection efforts to new levels is dependent 
upon eliminating cultural issues such as intelligence hoarding and classification hurdles.  
Digitization of information and transmittal of intelligence must be completed if 
information sharing is to be increased.  Inefficiencies, such as stove piping and 
duplication of effort must be reduced.  The goal of this new homeland security doctrine is 
to create detailed analytical products that adequately describe the threat domain to the 





1. Information Hoarding 
2. Intelligence Gaps 




1. Information Sharing 
2. HUMINT at Fusion centers 
3. Electronically recorded HUMINT 
4. Situational and Domain Awareness 




1. Stove Piping 





1. Analytical Threat Assessments with  
granular detail 
2. Opportunities for Law Enforcement  
to interdict or prevent terrorism 
3. Synergistic intelligence which  
encompasses Community Policing  
information 




                                                 
192 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston, MA: Harvard University 
Publishing Corporation, 2005). 
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The Blue Ocean Strategy Canvas, as described by Kim and Mauborgne, is an 
analytical framework that is both diagnostic and action oriented. The authors argue the 
value of a strategy canvas is its ability to capture the current state, provide an 
understanding of various factors impacting the current state and suggest alternatives.193     
The strategy canvass diagram for domestic collection expansion envisions 
information isolated at the state and local level released through knowledge management 
techniques and transmitted to regional fusion centers for use in analysis.  The leveraging 
of state and local collection information by fusion centers expands collection and 

















193 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 25.  
  
 





A comparison of the current environment versus the Blue Ocean Strategy for 
leveraging of state and local collection at the regional and national level reveals the 
advantages of the strategy.  
 








Produce Intelligence based on limited 
collection, including open source and 
intelligence community information.  
Shares information via formal and 
informal mechanisms. 
 
Detailed threat assessments 
produced using intelligence 
gleaned from regional 
fusion centers including 
granular detail from all 
communities. 
Large State 
and local law 
Enforcement 
Departments 
Produce Intelligence based on limited 
metropolitan intelligence gleaned from 
local collection and limited federal input.  
Share products on a limited basis through 
formal and informal mechanisms. 
Gain access to detailed 
National, state and local 
threat intelligence from 
regional fusion centers.  







Produce case specific intelligence using 
local criminal HUMINT and investigative 
information in support of local 
investigations.  Occasionally share 
information via formal and informal 
mechanisms, including task forces and 
conferences. 
Gain access to detailed 
National, state and local 
threat intelligence via 
fusion centers. Provide 
local data to fusion centers 




Do not produce intelligence. Do not 
generally have access to intelligence 
outside of informal networks.  Share 
information predominantly through 
informal networks and individual to 
individual. 
Gain access to detailed 
threat intelligence via 
fusion center.  Gain access 
to analytical capabilities 
via fusion centers.  Provide 
local data to fusion centers 
for aggregation analysis.   
 
Table 3.   Head-to-Head Comparison of Current Collection versus Proposed Strategy.194 
 
 
                                                 
194  Adapted from Kim and Mauborgne’s Blue Ocean Strategy. 
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B.  CONCLUSIONS  
Recent headlines illustrate the threat of Islamic extremists and that terrorism will 
be with us for many years to come.  Human intelligence from informants, criminals, 
good-Samaritans and cooperative individuals is the key to neutralizing major terrorist 
plots.   Coordinated terrorism investigations such as the Lackawanna Six and the Fort Dix 
Six demonstrate that HUMINT is vital to the prevention mission.  Up to this point, 
however, law enforcement has relied on personnel training, recruiting of informants and 
appeals to the public for the expansion of our HUMINT collection. While these efforts 
have been laudable and effective thus far, officials must leverage all of their resources if 
the United States is to defeat a more stealthy and cunning enemy.    
Post September 11th studies, such as the National Commission on Terrorist Acts 
upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report) confirm that the Al Qaeda 
hijackers came into contact with law enforcement at various stages of their plot.  No one 
will ever know if these brief contacts could have led to preventing the attack, since the 
hijackers were careful to insulate themselves as much as possible.  Without a concerted 
strategy to leverage all of our domestic HUMINT, however, we are at risk of repeating 
history.   
It is now evident that information sharing alone will not prevent the next major 
act of terror.  Most intelligence entities in government claim they are overwhelmed with 
the volume of information available.  For the same reason, is also not enough to merely 
share random information.  What is required is a strategy to coordinate HUMINT 
collection and use the increasingly awesome power of technology to sift through and 
analyze it.   
The public expects law enforcement, intelligence and first responder entities to 
keep them safe.  It also expects government to protect individuals’ civil liberties and 
privacy.  It is now evident that an expansion of both overt and covert HUMINT is 
necessary if we are to prevent major acts of terrorism.  Before officials set out to create 
new agencies, new laws and a new domestic HUMINT network, they should take 
advantage of every bit of HUMINT collection available today.  Law enforcement already 
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has the infrastructure in place and collectors embedded in the communities across the 
nation.  What is needed now is the implementation of a coordination strategy including 
the exploitation of technology.  
A coordination strategy will unite the varied and disperse collection efforts 
throughout the United States.  It would also take into account the enormous untapped law 
enforcement resources outside the urban areas and not represented by larger inner-city 
departments.  The strategy would encourage sharing and discourage hoarding, at a 
cultural and technological level.  The technology will do the heavy lifting of sifting 
through the enormous amounts of information to find the key piece of information.  It 
also will free the individual collector from the burden of deciding what is and is not 
important to report.  Finally, it will assist analysts with link technology that can take 
advantage of the semantic process of the XML computer language. Together, the strategy 
and technology will become part of new homeland security doctrine that could unleash 
the full potential of domestic collection and provide the missing pieces of the intelligence 
puzzle.  Perhaps most importantly, all this will be accomplished in an efficient way, using 
existing domestic collection and within existing federal, state and local laws, thereby 
protecting civil liberties from more intrusive methods of domestic collection.  
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Adoption of Global Justice XML Data Standard as intelligence collaboration 
“coin of the realm.” 
2. National coordination of collaborative platforms such as NDEx, HSIN, 
RISS and LEO in conjunction with regional warehouse systems such as 
LiNX for extraction of stove piped state and local collection information. 
3.  National Domestic HUMINT Collection Requirements and Standardized 
HUMINT Reporting Guidelines, including domestic Collection Managers 
with the authority to task domestic collection. 
4. Expansion of Fusion Center Guidelines to include fusion center process and 
networking of HUMINT from outside urban areas. 
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5. Grant process for the expansion of state and local HUMINT including 
training, technical upgrades, and knowledge management software in 
support of strategy implementation. 
6. Expanded fusion intelligence process to include all public and private sector 
community groups engaged in overt HUMINT.  
 80
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